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ABSTRACT 
 
At the end of 2010, the world was caught off guard in the face of a wave of 
revolutionary movements throughout North Africa and the Middle East, which have 
since then, come to be referred to as the “Arab Spring”. At a time when Turkey’s 
regional influence has been on the increase, these movements triggered the re-
emergence of the concept of a “Turkish Model”. The aim of the current thesis is to 
provide an analysis of the conceptual debate on Turkey’s role as a model. This 
analysis is based on the assumption that there is no fixed definition of the Turkish 
Model and that, instead, there are varying perceptions about it. The first chapter is an 
introduction where existentialist and epistemological concerns regarding the Turkish 
Model are addressed. In the second chapter, first, a historical account of the Turkish 
Modernization process is given with the aim to provide the background on which model 
debates emerge and then, the three historical moments of model debates about Turkey 
are explained. The third chapter narrates the transformation that Turkey experienced in 
the last decade, which has led to the creation of the “New Turkey”. This transformation, 
which can be considered as a continuation of Turkey’s modernization process, is 
particularly important in understanding the emergence and appeal effect of the latest 
set of debates of the Turkish Model. The fourth chapter focuses on these debates that 
and presents various perceptions and arguments. Overall, the thesis aims to 
demonstrate its initial assumption that though the Turkish Model exists as a discursive 
reality, a fixed definition is problematic, as various actors use and abuse the model in 
accordance with their individual interests, aims and ideologies. 
 
Keywords: Turkish Model, Arab Spring, Turkish Modernization, New Turkey. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Am Ende des Jahres 2010, wurde die Welt durch eine Welle von revolutionären 
Bewegungen in ganz Nordafrika und dem Nahen Osten, welche seither als “Arabischer 
Frühling” bezeichnet werden,  überrascht. Zur Zeit als der regionale Einfluss der Türkei 
im Ansteigen war, haben diese Bewegungen das erneute Auftauchen des Konzepts 
eines “Türkischen Models” ausgelöst. Das Ziel dieser  Arbeit ist es eine Analyse der 
konzeptionellen Debatte über die Rolle der Türkei als Model darzustellen. Diese 
Analyse basiert auf der Annahme, dass es kein feste Definition des “Türkischen 
Models” gibt und das es anstatt dessen variierende Perzeptionen dieses Models gibt. 
Das erste Kapitel ist eine Einführung, in welcher existentialistische und 
epistemologische Bedenken bezüglich des “Türkischen Models” behandelt werden. Im 
zweiten Kapitel, gibt es zuerst eine historische Darstellung des Prozesses der 
türkischen Modernisierung mit dem Ziel eine Grundlage zu schaffen auf welcher 
Modeldebatten entstehen um dann drei historische Momente der Modeldebatten über 
die Türkei zu beschreiben. Das dritte Kapitel erzählt die Transformation welche die 
Türkei im letzten Jahrzehnt erfahren hat, welche zur Erschaffung der “Neuen Türkei” 
geführt hat. Diese Transformation, welche als Weiterführung des türkischen 
Modernisierungsprozesses gesehen werden kann, ist besonders wichtig um den 
Enstehungs- und Anziehungseffekt der letzten Debatten über das “Türkische Model“ 
verstehen zu können. Das vierte Kapitel konzentriert sich auf diese Debatten und 
präsentiert verschiedene Perzeptionen und Argumente. Insgesamt ist das Ziel dieser 
Arbeit ihren Ausgangspunkt zu veranschaulichen, dass das türkische Modell als 
diskursives Modell zwar existiert, eine fixe Definition aber problematisch ist, weil die 
Akteure dieses Modell entsprechend ihrer jeweiligen Interessen, Ziele und Ideologien 
benützen und missbrauchen. 
 
Stichworte: Türkisches Modell, Arabischer Frühling, Prozesses der türkischen 
Modernisierung, Neue Türkei.  
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION  
 
Towards the end of 2010, the international community was caught off guard in the face 
of a wave of revolutionary movements throughout the MENA (Middle East and North 
Africa) region. Since then, these movements have been referred to as the “Arab 
Revolutions”, “Arab Uprisings” or most commonly as the “Arab Spring”.1 The young 
Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi’s burning himself after being harassed and 
humiliated by officials has become one of the most recollected symbols of these 
rebellions against the social injustices, financial inequalities and political oppressions 
that have been prevalent in many Arab countries for decades. It could also be regarded 
as an indicator of the degree of desperateness these peoples had reached; their lives 
as such were not worth living for. Indeed, the following weeks and months showed that 
it was not just Bouazizi, not the Tunisians but Arabs throughout the MENA region that 
decided to take action against these corrupted and unjust regimes. The peoples of the 
MENA region had had enough with the regimes that were in fact, only republics in 
name.  
 These movements appeared as unexpected not only due to the long time 
acceptance of the status quo of the region but also because of the Orientalist 
misconception that the peoples of these countries were incapable of any democratic 
uprising. However, contrary to these misconceptions, protests took place all over the 
region and resulted in the overthrowing of long time dominant dictators such as Zine El 
Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. Of 
course, this is not to say the Arab Spring has produced similar results in all of the 
countries it affected and it most likely will not.2 In each country, the accumulation of 
political, economic and cultural experiences has formed the soil upon which the Arab 
Spring blossomed. The results have varied from protests of various degrees to 
governmental changes, civil war and – in the case of a few – revolution.3 Despite this 
variety, the Arab Spring has been regarded by a large majority of the international 
community as having the potential to being an important step towards future changes 
for a more politically democratic system, which respects human rights and which is 
principled on the rule of law and separation of powers. There have been, of course, 
                                               
1
 Each of these terms has been criticized for various reasons. For instance, the use of the word 
“revolution” has met with scepticism and the positive connotations of the word “spring” were questioned. I 
am aware of these however, for the purposes of identifying and distinguishing the incidents in their spatial 
and temporal state of being, the phrase the “Arab Spring” will be used throughout this thesis.    
 
2
 Nathalie Tocci, Turkey and the Arab Spring: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy in a Transatlantic 
Perspective, 12 September 2011. http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/12turkey-and-arab-spring- 
implications-for-turkish-foreign-policy-in-transatlantic-perspective (accessed 5 December 2011).    
 
3
 For a map of showing the various results and the state of the Arab Spring in the region see Appendix 1.  
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also critical reviews of the incidents in the Arab world and some of these are dealt with 
in later sections.  
 From the very beginning, the Arab Spring has been closely observed globally 
and the events have been the cause of heated discussions at political, media and 
academic circles. Within these discussions, Turkey came to be frequently mentioned 
by various actors. Actors as diverse as US Foreign Minister, Hillary Clinton, the former 
Chairman of the Egpytian armed forces, Hussein Tantawi, the leader of the Ennahda 
Movement of Tunisia, Rashid al-Ghannushi and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, all refer to Turkey, though in dissimilar and sometimes even conflicting ways.4 
The overall theme in these accounts is the role of Turkey as a model during the 
transition that the MENA is going through. However, there are particular reasons that 
these diverse actors refer to Turkey. The search for a regional power in the MENA, 
which has been one of the most conflict-ridden regions of the world for centuries, could 
be one reason for this; after all, Turkey has been quoted as a potential regional leader 
competing with Iran and Egypt.5 In this respect, emphasis has been made on Turkey’s 
geographical location, demographic figures, democratic and modern political structure, 
relative political stability and social and economic welfare. However, these discussions 
have gone well beyond traditional discourses on regional power structures and have 
ignited the idea that Turkey could be a model for these Arab countries thus resulting in 
the re-emergence of the concept of a “Turkish Model”6.  
Upon the introduction of the phrase of a Turkish Model into the text, one is 
obliged to answer for two sets of questions; the first is a product of existentialist 
concerns and the second of epistemological ones. The next two subsections deal with 
these concerns respectively. 
 
1.1 Is there a Turkish Model? 
 
Prior to any attempt at defining what is meant by the phrase of a Turkish Model, it is 
necessary to address scepticism regarding the existence of such a model. First and 
foremost, it must be said that the talk on any Turkish Model in its concrete sense; that 
                                               
4
 Sinan Ülgen, “From Inspiration to Aspiration - Turkey in the New Middle East.” The Carnegie Papers, 
Washington DC, December 2011 [online paper]; available from 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/turkey_mid_east.pdf  (accessed 27 April 2012), 3. 
 
5
 Yaşar Yakış, “Suriye’de kaybedersek Ortadoğu’da da kaybederiz.” [“If we lose in Syria, we will lose in the 
Middle East”] interviewed by Şenay Yıldız, 18 July 2012. http://www.aksam.com.tr/suriyede-kaybedersek-
ortadoguda-da-kaybederiz--127860h.html (accessed 7 August 2012).  
 
6
 From here onwards, the phrase is not given in quotations; however, the reader is requested to consider it 
as if it has been since I focus on the discourses using this term.   
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is, a model which is consciously formulated and systematically structured does not 
exist. Therefore, it is not possible to point out to any singular and existing Turkish 
Model. Some may argue against this by presenting the main characteristics (e.g. 
political, economic, social etc.) of what is referred to as the Turkish Model. These 
characteristics and the opponents of such arguments are explained at length in the 
next section. However, the fact is that this presentation shall certainly differ from other 
presentations of the Turkish Model; hence, the point that there exists no concrete and 
fixed model but rather different perceptions of what the model is or should contain. This 
point becomes clearer later on, when these different perceptions are dealt with in 
further detail.  
Surprisingly, some others will use the absence of the aforementioned 
characteristics as the basis for their argument that no such Turkish Model exists.7 It is 
true that the presence, absence and validity of these characteristics are open to 
discussion. This is not within the scope of this thesis to resolve any questions on that 
ground. Nevertheless, it must be said that such arguments only help to strengthen the 
fact that there exist different perceptions of what different speakers believe the Turkish 
Model is and this is precisely what the current study will focus on. The mere presence 
of arguments regarding a Turkish Model – regardless of the different characteristics 
they are based upon and whether they argue for or against a model – is thought to be 
sufficient for the purposes of analysing the discourses referring to a Turkish Model. 
Indeed, though the model does not exist in form, described with definitive authority, as 
it has been admitted earlier, it does very much exist in the conceptual sphere as can be 
seen from the references made throughout this thesis. In addition, because various 
political and social movements as well as individual authors from very different 
countries refer to it, it comes in fact, into “existence”.  
 To sum up, considering the Turkish Model as a discursive reality, this thesis 
assumes the existence of a Turkish Model as something people refer to in their ways to 
conceptualize the present situation as well as the expected future in the whole region 
(and far beyond) and thus, treats it accordingly.                     
 
1.2 What is the Turkish Model? 
 
This question is the first and perhaps the most frequently asked question regarding the 
Turkish Model. The answer is not as simple as the question, this is partly due to what 
                                               
7
 An example may be the arguments of Ece Temelkuran in This House believes Turkey is a bad model for 
the Arab States, moderated by Tim Sebastian, 12 January, 2012. 
 www.thedohadebates.com/debates/item/?d=116&s=&&mode=transcript (accessed 23 June 2012).    
4 
 
was explained above; that is, the Turkish Model is a concept and a highly debated one. 
The way it is perceived differs quite a lot depending on two aspects: the context in 
which it is brought up (i.e. the time and place in which it is mentioned as well as the 
event with which it is associated) and the subject of perception (i.e. the individual or 
group who perceives). Regarding the first of these, it must be known that the concept 
of the Turkish Model is not a novel one. There have been several times in history and 
at different locations where Turkey was presented as a model. These are explained in 
detail in the second chapter where the history of the talk on the Turkish Model is given 
and in the fourth chapter where the contemporary discussion regarding a Turkish 
Model that has been re-introduced into international discourse, this time in the context 
of the Arab Spring, is explained.  
As to the second aspect that affects the perception of the model, it must be said 
that the ideology of the perceiver determines not only if he or she chooses to support 
the model or not, but also how he or she defines it. What makes the contemporary 
Turkish Model very interesting is the fact that actors belonging to political groups with 
seemingly conflicting ideologies consider Turkey as a model for the countries of the 
Arab Spring or wish to see it working as a blueprint for future development in the 
region. This fact has also been pointed out by Burhannettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz who 
ask the questions, “whose model?” and “which Turkey?” and provide categories of 
“political groups with competing narratives”.8 Their arguments are explained in greater 
detail in chapter four along with other arguments surrounding the model debates. 
There, the ideological backgrounds of various perceptions of the Turkish Model are laid 
out through the arguments of intellectuals of leading think tanks in the field, academics, 
journalists and policy makers.  
However, at this stage, the reader must be provided with at least a general idea 
of what the Turkish Model is, or could be imagined as. The best way to do this is by 
going through the main characteristics, which more than often form the basis of 
explanations on the Turkish Model. After surveying numerous academic and 
journalistic articles, the author has grouped a comprehensive set of characteristics that 
would best summarize the vast storage of ideas on what the Turkish Model is. Similar 
accounts are provided in Sinan Ülgen’s “From Inspiration to Aspiration - Turkey in the 
New Middle East”, Emad Y. Kaddorah’s “The Turkish Model: Acceptability and 
Apprehension” and Aswini K. Mohapatra’s “Democratization in the Arab World: 
Relevance of the Turkish Model”. These have been especially beneficial in the 
                                               
8
 Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz, Whose Model? Which Turkey?, 8 February 2011, 
mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/08/whose_model_which_turkey (accessed 15 March 2012).       
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preparation of this section. Below, each of these characteristics has been described, 
with the aim to provide the reader with a thorough idea of what aspects are referred to 
when defining the Turkish Model. The reader is requested to read relevant sections of 
chapters two and four, for more detailed accounts.  
The most commonly cited characteristic of the Turkish Model is doubtless the 
argument that Turkey has laid bare the falsity of the claim “Islam is incompatible with 
democracy”. The importance of this characteristic can be understood when one takes 
into consideration the significant place that Islam occupies in the social and political 
realms of the Arab world as well as the Arab peoples’ search for democratic regimes 
that conforms with the social and cultural realities of the region. In this sense, Turkey is 
likened to a black swan that deconstructs Orientalist, polarizing arguments that set 
Islam and democracy against each other.9 As can be implied from this metaphor, what 
is believed to make Turkey special is that it sets an example not so much through what 
it does but through what it is.10 This portrayal of Turkey as a modern and democratic 
yet Muslim country has not always been thus; it is the result of more than a century of 
reconciliation of Turkish Islam and forces of modernism.11 This point is developed, in 
detail, in the first part of the second chapter as well as section 3.1.    
As one of these forces of modernism, secularism and its relationship with 
political Islam form one essential part of the aforementioned characteristic. Secularism 
has also become one of the most debated elements of the Turkish Model; while it is 
considered indispensable by certain groups, for others it has proved to be rather 
difficult to embrace. Nevertheless, the unique interplay between secularism and 
political Islam in the past four decades is of great importance for how the model has 
come to be thought of today and in a way, the Adelet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)12 that 
has been in power since 2002 can be seen as the latest product of this interplay. 
Indeed, the AKP has frequently been referred to in defining the contemporary Turkish 
Model and some have gone so far as to refer to the AKP as a model.13 The party does 
have political Islamist roots and thus a conservative image but at the same time, it 
                                               
9
 Mustafa Kutlay and Osman Bahadır Dinçer, “Arap Baharı, Türkiye-AB İşbirliğini Yeniden Ateşler mi?”, 
Analist, no. 6 (August 2011): 13. 
  
10
 Ülgen, “From Inspiration to Aspiration”, 1. 
 
11
See Şerif Mardin, Religion, Society and Modernity in Turkey, (Syracuse University, 2006).  
 
12
 Justice and Development Party (JDP)  
 
13
 Emad Y. Kaddorah, “The Turkish Model: Acceptability and Apprehension” Insight Turkey 12, no. 4,  
2010, 113-129 [online journal]; available from 
http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight_turkey_vol_12_no_4_2010_kaddorah.pdf (accessed 15 March 
2012), 114.  
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seems to have managed to conform to the secular structure of the state.14 
Furthermore, this compromise appears to agree with a majority of the Turkish 
population as the party has been elected for a third term. 
It is not difficult to imagine why some equate the Turkish Model with the AKP. 
During the last 10 years in which AKP has been in power, Turkey has witnessed 
unprecedented transformations in various spheres and many of these – righteously or 
not – have been associated with the AKP. The following two characteristics of the 
Turkish Model – the civil-military relations and economic development – are examples 
of these transformations.  
The military has had a determinant role during the times of the empire and its 
influence continued into the Republic, as the founding fathers of the modern day 
Turkey were military officials. Perhaps for this fact, the military has assumed the role of 
the guardian of the republic’s official ideology – Kemalism – and all its constituents. 
Until recently, this function of the military has allowed it to intervene in the politics of the 
state, making use of fears of Islamism, Kurdism or Communism.15 Overtime, this 
intervention has resulted in three conventional and two postmodern coup d’états. 
During the AKP government, the well-rooted role of the ‘military as guardian of state’ 
has been altered with recent constitutional changes, which aimed at keeping the 
military away from politics. In addition to this, the authority of the military was damaged 
by the Ergenekon trials16. The result is a transformation in civil-military relations. It must 
be stated, however, that as a characteristic of the Turkish Model, civil-military relations 
has been interpreted differently. Scholars have pointed out that the authoritarian 
secular elite of the Arab world could aspire to the Turkish Model of “controlled 
modernization under military tutelage”17 which seems to be in stark contrast with the 
civilizing trend of the recent years, which is supposedly aspired by groups that are 
more liberal. Once again, it becomes evident that any definition of the model that 
disregards the different perceptions of Turkey can only go so much.  
                                               
14
 Ibid., 114-115.  
 
15
 Ülgen, “From Inspiration to Aspiration,” 7; Ahmet T. Kuru, “The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage in 
Turkey: Fears of Islamism, Kurdism, and Communism” Insight Turkey 14, no. 2, 37-57 [online journal]; 
available from http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight-turkey_vol_14_no_2_2012_kuru.pdf (accessed 
13 June 2012), 37-38.     
 
16
 ‘Ergenekon’ is the name given to a clandestine organization, thought to have connections with the ‘deap 
state’, which supposedly plotted a military coup against the government. The trials against this 
organization continue since 2008 and hundreds of people, a majority of which are high-ranking military 
officials and members of the traditional secular elite, have been detained and are being trialed.      
 
17
 Duran and Yılmaz, Whose Model? Which Turkey?. 
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 The characteristic of economic development seems to be less controversial 
which gives even more reason for a greater critical analysis. Regional as well as global 
actors have appreciated the rapid and steady growth of the Turkish economy in the last 
decade. Opponents of the Turkish Model have especially emphasized this aspect since 
financial hardships rate among the first complaints of the people of the Arab Spring and 
the malfunctioning economies of the Arab world are in need of immediate reform.18 
Turkey’s economic development has directed attention to the policies of the AKP in the 
last decade. Although this transformation has to do with the policies of the AKP, its 
foundations lie in the neoliberal policies dating back to the 1980s and these require 
more in depth analysis of the history of the economic transformation Turkey went 
through. Moreover, the evolution of the relationship between the state and business 
community cannot be separated from this aspect of the model.19  
The fourth, characteristic of the Turkish Model is Turkey’s close connection with 
the West. Indeed, Turkey is not only thought to have worked out a reconcilement 
between Islam and democracy but also one between Islam and the West.20 The 
ideological roots of this reconcilement go back to the Kemalist vision of 
Westernization21 the reflections of which are visible in the history of Turkish foreign 
policy and Turkey’s position in the international arena. Turkey has been a member of 
the Council of Europe (CE) since 1949 the year of its establishment, and North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) since 1952 shortly after its establishment. It has also 
started its negotiations for accession to the European Union (EU) in 2005. Overtime, 
the Kemalist vision of Westernization and the relationship between Turkey and 
Western powers like the United States and EU has evolved. So that in recent years, 
Turkey has stood out more and more as an independent actor that is able to maintain 
good relations with the West.             
 The fifth characteristic of the Turkish Model can be summed up in the reference 
to an imperial legacy. Turkey is considered the principal heir of the Ottoman Empire 
that has ruled a geography encompassing a great deal of the MENA region and 
                                               
18
Rana Moussaoui, Moderate Arab Spring Islamists Look to ‘Turkish Model’ for New Democracies, 2 
December, 2011. http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/12/02/moderate-arab-spring-islamists-look-to-turkish-
model-for-new-democracies/ (accessed 9 December 2011).  
 
19
 Ülgen, “From Inspiration to Aspiration,” 9-10.  
 
20
 Hassan Nafaa, “The Turkish Model in the Mirror of the Arab Spring” in Turkey and the Arab Spring – 
Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy from a Transatlantic Perspective, Mediterranean Paper Series 
2011, 35-44 [online paper] (German Marshall Fund of the United States and Istituto Affari Internazionali); 
available from http://www.gmfus.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/toccietal_turkishmodel_nov11_final.pdf 
(accessed 5 December 2012), 43.  
 
21
 Ülgen, “From Inspiration to Aspiration,” 7. Also see, Meliha Benli Altunisik, The Turkish Model and 
Democratization in the Middle East, Arab Studies Quarterly 27, no. 1 and 2, Winter/Spring, 45-63. [online 
journal]; (EBSCOhost, accessed 9 February 2012).  
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including the states of the Arab Spring, most of the Balkans, parts of Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia and that has existed for over six centuries. Due to this position, 
Turkey has firstly inherited a centuries old statecraft tradition, part of which included the 
public respect for and acknowledgement of the importance of the state institution.22 
Sinan Ülgen claims that these bureaucratic tradition was very important for the 
consolidation of democratic rule in Turkey and thus for the formation of contemporary 
debates on the Turkish Model.23 Very much related to this aspect of the imperial legacy 
is the inheritance in the sphere of the foreign policy. According to Mustafa Aydın, the 
legacy of the Ottoman Empire is one of the main structural determinants of Turkish 
foreign policy.24 Aydın provides the specific elements of the foreign policy of the 
Ottoman Empire that the Republic inherited. A closer analysis of these in the following 
sections show that they can be considered among the ferment that makes up the 
Turkish Model. 
 The final characteristic of the Turkish Model is the unique geographical location 
of Turkey, often expressed through the well-known metaphor of the bridge between 
Asia and Europe. This characteristic has not only resulted in ambivalence regarding 
Turkey’s categorization in either Asia or Europe but along with other characteristics, it 
has had consequences beyond mere categorization. Though some critiques might 
suspect exaggeration, it would not be incorrect to say that this rather physical realty 
has also influenced the dual character that so well marks the Turk identity, at the level 
of the individual. But, returning to the macro level, it is easy to imagine how well 
Turkey’s unique geographical location fits with “the combination of modernism and 
traditionalism, secularism and Islamism, its [Turkey’s] dual Western and Eastern 
orientations”.25 It not only supports the other characteristics of the Turkish Model but 
also enables model debates to be easily appropriated to the surrounding regions (i.e. 
Central Asia, the Balkans, MENA, and Eastern Europe). Combining this characteristic 
with the common Ottoman past, many opponents of the Turkish Model indicate the 
comparative cultural affinities that Turkey has with its neighbours and its status as a 
soft power. 
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1.3 Why is the Arab Spring important for Turkey and vice versa? 
 
There is a thin line between what the Turkish Model is defined as and why Turkey 
should or could be proposed as a model. In the previous section, the former of these 
was explained through the narration of the characteristics that were brought up in 
describing or referring to the Turkish Model, in the hope of drawing an image in the 
minds of the readers of what the model is thought to be. On the other hand, the latter 
has to do with Turkey’s potential of being a model and the dynamics that cause it to be 
presented as one which, although very much related to the former, is slightly different. 
This difference can be better understood if one asks, why the Arab Spring is important 
for Turkey and why Turkey, in turn, is important for the Arab Spring.  
 Several reasons could be listed to explain the significance of the Arab Spring for 
Turkish policy makers. The first of these has to do with security – as Nathalie Tocci has 
stated the Arab Spring has revealed “the inherent tensions between the normative and 
realpolitik dimensions of Turkish foreign policy”.26 Indeed, as the Arab Spring reminded 
once again that the region is far from being free of problems and that Turkey cannot 
avoid the security issues that have been raised in the wake of the events, some 
academics have even written about the death of the idealistic  ‘zero problems with 
neighbours’ policy27 of current Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. Of the four 
countries that experienced the Arab Spring most profoundly, Syria has an 877 km long 
land border with Turkey while Tunisia, Libya and Egypt are separated from Turkey only 
by the Mediterranean Sea. Due to this geographical proximity, it is understandable that 
the Turkish state would want to avoid of any large-scale instability in the region. In 
particular, the flows of refugees from these countries, the insecurity of Turkish citizens 
residing in or often commuting to and from these regions, the exploitation of these 
situations by terrorist groups such as the Partiya Kerkerên Kurdistan (PKK)28 and the 
risks that the sectarian conflicts might spark similar ones in Turkey necessitate the 
close attention of the Turkish state.29  
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The second aspect that makes the Arab Spring important for Turkey is 
economics. Expansion of Turkish trade and investment in the Middle East is an 
important factor that shapes Turkish foreign policy towards the Arab world.30 In fact, 
Turkey’s economic interests have been the most important factor in forming the Turkish 
state’s country-specific reactions to the events of the Arab Spring.31 For instance, 
Turkey’s initial reluctance for intervention in Libya, which is one of the largest overseas 
markets for Turkish construction companies, could be attributed to Turkey’s economic 
concerns. Eventually, Turkish companies had an incurred loss of $1.4 billion and had to 
leave unfinished projects worth an estimated $15 billion. A similar pattern of economic 
loss could be drawn with other Arab Spring countries.32 Thus, in the aftermath of the 
Arab Spring, Turkish economy is perhaps the most affected non-Arab economy and 
this is another reason that obliges Turkey to be extremely attentive to the events.  
A relatively weaker argument can be made about the importance of the Arab 
Spring for Turkey by claiming that a religious segment of the Turkish public is 
concerned about the well-being of their fellow Muslim brothers and sisters. This is in 
line with the rhetoric that has been used by some AKP officials; indeed, earlier 
Davutoğlu had stated about the Arab spring that the “Islamic world is going through a 
unique crisis”33 emphasizing the responsibility that Turkey and Iran had in this regard. 
A similar argument would be to claim that a conservative nationalist segment of the 
Turkish public have concerns for the peoples of the MENA, stemming from historical 
commonalities. Admittedly, these idealist arguments seem weaker compared to realist 
ones about security and economics. However, they weigh heavier when they are seen 
within the larger framework of regional power structures in the MENA region. The shifts 
in Turkish foreign policy is said to signal Turkey’s aspiration to be a leader in the region 
and such rhetoric hinting at Turkish religious or cultural affinities with the Arab peoples 
help strengthen this aspiration. Although the security and economic reasons mentioned 
above may give the impression that the Arab Spring has had negative influences for 
Turkey in the short-term, the last arguments could mean that in the long-term the Arab 
Spring presents opportunities for Turkey as the region is restructuring. This is exactly 
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where the model debates gain a new meaning and this is explored in the fourth 
chapter.34          
Now it is necessary to turn the tables and consider why Turkey is important for 
the Arab Spring. As mentioned in the beginning of the section, answering this question 
has a lot to do with trying to define what the Turkish Model is. Though this question is 
answered throughout the thesis, a summarized reply is provided here. At the heart of 
the debates about the Turkish Model in the context of the Arab Spring, lies the dual 
character of Turkey. Indeed, if one were to specify an all-embracing theme it would be 
this duality, which originates from Turkey’s well-rooted affiliations with both the West 
and the East. Turkey’s geographical location is only one of the factors that have made 
this process, which started well-before the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 
1923, easier. Although this process could hypothetically be taken even further back in 
history, for the purposes of this study, it is considered to have begun with the initial 
stages of modernization, evident in the reforms of the Late Ottoman Period. The 
process gained a keener element of Westernization with the Kemalist ideology 
dominant in the Republican era and has developed over the next decades. What 
makes it distinct is the ongoing and evolving interplay of Western concepts such as 
secularism and democracy and the elements arising from Turkey’s Muslim and Eastern 
identity. This hybrid identity is what the contemporary model debates – as well as other 
discourses privileging the role of Turkey in the Arab Spring – are actually based upon. 
Thus, Turkey is argued to be important for the Arab Spring as a state that is as much 
‘one of them’ as it is Western. From another point, the lack of orientation that is often 
present following any revolution, also creates a need for models, and so Turkey’s role 
as a model is another reason that renders Turkey important in the context of the Arab 
Spring.    
Before concluding this section, though it is not stated in the title, one may go 
one-step further and ask what the underlying reasons are for portraying Turkey as 
important for the Arab Spring and by whom this is done. This question guides the 
concerns of the author especially in the fourth chapter where among other issues 
surrounding the model debates, the Western origins of the debates are discussed.  
 
1.4 The Findings and Objectives of the Research Project 
   
Many articles and reports have been written on various aspects of the Turkish Model. A 
group of these sources focus on certain historical versions of the model, such as the 
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articles written in the period after of the collapse of the Soviet Union by scholars such 
as Andrew Mango or idris Bal. Another group of works deal with the relationship of a 
specific subject with the Turkish Model, for instance, articles that deal with 
democratization and the Turkish Model.35 Furthermore, recently there has been an 
increase in articles and reports that deal with the Turkish Model in the context of the 
Arab Spring.36 These mostly focus on issues such as the relevance or the applicability 
of the Turkish Model. While they provide significant observations on the characteristics 
and historical development of the Turkish Model, they are relatively short. Thus, a 
thorough and systematic academic study is yet to be done and this project tries to fill 
that gap by providing an analysis of the conceptual debate on the Turkish Model. In this 
regard, one of the most important results of the current research has been the 
assumption that there is no fixed definition of the Turkish Model and that there are 
varying perceptions about the model. This realization allows the author to take a critical 
distance away from discursive formations that might cloud one’s judgement. In other 
words, by acknowledging the multiplicity of perceptions about the model, instead of 
arguing for or against a model, the author situates himself or herself at a position to 
spot the naive use or abuse of the model. In previous studies, each of these assertive 
perceptions has been introduced and sometimes even a few of them have been 
juxtaposed or contrasted. What distinguishes this study in that respect is the fact that it 
attempts to bring all of these under one roof.  
 The main finding of the study has been that these varying perceptions are 
organized diachronically as well as synchronically; and the aim is to present both. In 
presenting the first set of perceptions, the historical development of the model debates 
about Turkey is provided through which the readers are shown that the concept of the 
Turkish Model is not a novel one. The second set presents the perceptions about the 
model that exists simultaneously or consequentially. This last section focuses on the 
most recent interpretations of the model – those that emerged in the concept of the 
Arab Spring. In order to make sense of the changes in the definition of the concept, 
processes of modernization and democratization of Turkey are dealt with. In other 
words, at the background of the narration of these varying sets of perceptions is a 
narration of Turkey’s transformation since its establishment with a specific focus on the 
rapid and abundant changes of the last decade.  
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In this context, it has become evident that the recent transformations in Turkish 
foreign policy especially concerning the Middle East are meaningful. Hence, another 
objective of the research project is to present Turkey’s changing relations with the Arab 
world and the implications of this for model debates and the Arab Spring. The main 
assumption is that a new set of debates on the Turkish Model has emerged – this time, 
in the context of the Arab Spring – and the main arguments surrounding these debates 
are brought together in this research project. The debates are strongly related to the 
growing global trend of regionalization as well as other processes of globalization; 
hence, the research project is in accordance with the research agenda of global 
studies.    
 
1.5 Methodology       
 
An extensive literature review was conducted for sources in both English and Turkish. 
These sources included official as well as unofficial publications such as books, 
journals, reports, conference proceedings, dissertations and theses and interviews. 
Furthermore, audio sources such as news and radio broadcasts, lectures and 
conferences have also been used. These have helped to determine the extent of 
research as well as theory in the field, define some concepts and detect areas that 
required more research.  
Apart from the primary and secondary sources mentioned above, the research 
project is based on five semi-structured expert interviews. A comprehensive list of 
interviewees has been outlined out of staff of universities and think tanks as well as 
policy makers. This list has been narrowed down and potential interviewees have been 
contacted. The first of the interviewees was Prof. Dr. Talip Küçükcan, the Director of 
Foreign Policy Research at SETAV37. The second interviewee was İbrahim Kalın, the 
current Chief Foreign Affairs Advisor of the Prime Minister. The third interviewee was 
Prof. Dr. İdris Bal, current AKP member of parliament. The fourth interviewee was Dr. 
M. Turgut Demirtepe, head of Central Asian Studies at USAK38. The fifth and final 
interviewee is expert on the Middle East, Asst. Prof. Mehmet Şahin from Gazi 
University and advisor at ORSAM39. In consideration of the qualitative nature of the 
research topic, the choice has been towards conducting semi-structured interviews. 
Certain common themes, issues and questions have been covered during the 
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interviews; however, specific questions and issues have also been asked depending on 
the particular expertise of each interviewee. The semi-structured nature of the 
interviews has left room for any issue or question that arouse during the interviews. All 
the interviews have been recorded by means of a digital recording device and the audit 
versions are in the files of the author and are available upon request.  
The parts of the topic that deal with historical processes have relied mainly on 
written documents and partly on the interviews. A great deal of the project deals with 
the perceptions of a wide variety of individuals ranging from state officials to 
intellectuals. In this respect, in addition to the interviews, the productions of think tanks 
have played a pivotal role. They not only reflect the views of their authors but they also 
provide information on public opinion by means of surveys  and field research which 
they are able to conduct due to their broader financial and network capacities.   
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CHAPTER II: TURKISH MODERNIZATION AND THE HISTORY OF THE MODEL 
DEBATES 
 
2.1 TURKISH MODERNIZATION  
 
Giving an account of Turkish modernization is a very challenging task. First of all, it is 
possible to trace the roots of this process several centuries in the past. Moreover, its 
speed varies according to external and internal developments as well as the sphere in 
which it has taken place. Among the factors that have influenced its acceleration were 
the advances in communication and transportation technologies (i.e. the establishment 
of the printing press, newspapers, railways etc.) as part of the industrial revolution and 
increasing imperial interests. What is more, this process has always involved the 
interplay of the forces of continuity and those of change. After all, the dynamics of 
modernization have not always been easily accepted; there have been times when 
they met counter-modernization movements. These conflicting forces of the Turkish 
and other modernization processes characterize the modern age and are extremely 
significant for the global condition.    
 In line with this significance and multidimensionality, hundreds of books, theses, 
dissertations and articles have been written on Turkish modernization. Of course, 
providing a thorough explanation of this process is well beyond the boundaries of this 
thesis. Moreover, elaborating upon these would not serve to accomplish the main aims 
of this work. Nevertheless, when attempting to analyze the debates on the Turkish 
Model, one cannot completely overlook Turkey’s modernization process. In fact, many 
of the characteristics described in the first chapter are grounded in this process. It is for 
this reason that in this section, a brief account of the roots of Turkish modernization 
process, starting from the Late Ottoman Period to the establishment of the Turkish 
Republic and the Kemalist ideology it has been based on, shall be given. This will also 
help in making sense of the second of this chapter, which deals with the history of the 
model debates.    
 
2.1.1 The Roots of Modernization: The Late Ottoman Period  
 
From the beginning of the rise of Western power in the 16th century to the time when it 
reached world superiority in the mid of the 19th century, the Islamic world and Asia has 
experienced a gradual decrease in power.40 The Ottoman Empire was not an exception 
to this trend. The most powerful European actor of the 15th and 16th centuries, the 
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Ottoman Empire is generally considered to have entered a period of standstill in the 
17th century, followed by one of decline, which is traditionally claimed to begin in the 
18th century. Interestingly enough, during this period one can also observe an 
awakening in the Ottomans reflected in the so-called ‘Ottoman Renaissance’, known 
more commonly as the ‘Tulip Age’. During this short-lived renaissance, the orientations 
of the Ottoman court and intellectuals transformed from a primary interest in territorial 
expansion to one in arts and entertainment. It could be characterized as the first time in 
the empire’s history when the West became any source of inspiration. This era 
provided the basis for the Westernized modernizing reforms of the late 18th and 19th 
century. This awakening and turn to the West is most evident in the report that Mehmet 
Çelebi, an ambassador sent to France in 1720 by Ahmet III, presented. Here, Çelebi 
questions the recent military failures of the Ottomans against Western armies and 
points to the fact that the empire should be awakened and pay great attention to the 
methods, networks, strategies and military advances of the West.41                         
 This was the first time that the Ottomans became aware of this need; however, 
it took until the times of Selim III (1789-1807) and Mahmud II (1808-1839) to be put into 
practice. These rulers implemented state-sponsored military reforms but “did not 
question the cultural norms, social structures or political relationships on which the 
Ottoman order rested”.42 Even so, Selim III’s attempts to create an entirely new infantry 
corps and establish permanent embassies in European capitals were not met 
peacefully by the derebey-ulama-Janissary coalition and he was murdered. His 
successor Mahmud II proceeded more cautiously in the face of this coalition; after 
disempowering the derebeys using the Janissaries, he eradicated the Janissaries. He 
also took certain measures to limit the authority of the ulama, the class of religious 
scholars. He then implemented reforms in both the military and the bureaucracy; 
opening new schools, embassies in Europe, translation offices, introducing the more 
Europeanized fez and frock coat and founding the first gazette published in Ottoman-
Turkish.43 The expenses of these reforms have contributed greatly to the economic fall 
of the empire, ending in its bankruptcy in 1876.44  
 The reforms mentioned above prepared the basis for the creation of a new elite 
group that were trained either in Europe or in Mahmud II’s Europeanized academies 
and that spoke European languages and were committed to policies of Westernization. 
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Thus, the major reformists of the 19th century were not Sultans but an elite cadre of 
bureaucrats and intellectuals. The most renowned of these elite were Rashid Pasha 
(1800-1858), Ali Pasha (1815-1871) and Fuad Pasha (1815-1869), who all attained a 
European education and served as high-level Ottoman officials in London or Paris and 
later as foreign ministers and grand viziers in the Ottoman state. During this era, which 
has been labeled as the Tanzimat (literally, reorganizations), the modern ideology of 
nationalism also found its way into this Ottoman elite’s agenda, as part of the greater 
wave of Westernization. In this respect, two royal decrees followed by the Nationality 
Law of 1869 were introduced with the aim of creating “the notion of a common Ottoman 
citizenship, or Ottomanism”.45  
 As a reaction to the oppression by this elite group had upon the public, another 
group of Turkish intellectuals mainly from literary circles, the Young Ottomans, gained 
importance during the late Tanzimat, in the years 1867-1878. These individuals were 
also very much influenced by European thought; however, what distinguished them 
was their attempt to reconcile the European institutions and thoughts of the reforms 
with the Ottoman and Islamic tradition. They considered the Ottomans value system as 
superior to that of the West but believed in the necessity to have a constitutional 
government. In accordance with the reforms that this group had in mind, the first 
Ottoman Constitution was proclaimed in 1876 and a chamber of deputies was 
established. Yet this constitution was dissolved by Sultan Abdul Hamid II only two 
years later.46 The Sultan also had the Young Ottomans exiled.47 Approximately three 
decades later, this exiled community, along with a group of discontent civil servants 
and students as well as a coalition of disaffected army officers from Ottoman Europe, 
combined in a movement that would become known as the ‘Young Turks’. They 
organized under the group that would later become their political party, the Committee 
of Progress and Union (CUP). Following a revolt in the summer of 1908, the 
constitution was declared once again, on June 24 of the same year and CUP came to 
power. During this era, the Westernized reforms continued. By 1913, the CUP’s 
increasingly oppressive policies had turned the government into a military dictatorship 
under the triumvirate of Enver, Talat and Jamal Pashas. The untimely and half-baked 
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policies of CUP became one of the most important aspects that accelerated the fall 
leading to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.48                        
 The Ottoman awakening to the West’s relative progress that began in the Tulip 
Age was reflected, more than half a century later, in the military reforms of Selim III and 
then Mahmud II, which set the environment for the creation of a new group of elites that 
attained their power from their insight into the European political and intellectual 
system. This episode of modernizing reforms starting in the Tulip Age and continuing 
with varying speeds up until the end of the empire is extremely important for the more 
systematic and rapid transformation during and after the establishment of the Republic 
of Turkey. Indeed, what is depicted by this historical narrative is the beginnings of an 
era of transformation; one in which the value system of a centuries old empire comes 
to be questioned and gradually transformed. Several aspects of this transformation 
constitute the foundation of the modernization process of Republican times and these 
have been substantial in the emergence of the model debates. The first of these is the 
aspect of Westernization; indeed this is a characteristic that becomes even more 
evident in the Republican reforms where modernization is equated with 
Westernization.49 Another equally important aspect is secularization. This modern idea 
has gradually worked its way into the Ottoman order, which had been so well grounded 
in the Islamic tradition. The old institutions remained alongside the new ones and yet 
the segments of society that benefited from the old order that was based on a religious 
system of thought gradually found their power diminishing as the new elite’s power was 
increasing. Thus, both Westernization and secularization implied a direct influence in 
the established power structures. By the time of the Young Ottomans, the gap between 
the new elite and the traditional classes of power began to widen and this 
transformation in power structures and values set the necessary conditions for the 
reforms that the new Republic would implement.50 These constitute the topic of the 
next section.  
 
2.1.2 The New Turkish State and Modernization 
 
The century old accumulation of reforms in the Ottoman times continued with great 
rapidity and in all spheres of life in the new Turkish state established in 1923 under the 
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leadership of its founder Mustafa Kemal Pasha, later known as Atatürk51. The reforms 
progressed in a similar direction that is to say, they continued to get inspiration from the 
West, mainly because the Ottomanist and Islamist movements were almost ruled out 
by Mustafa Kemal and the other founders of the Republic who were either former 
members or sympathizers of the Western-oriented CUP which was dissolved by then. 
The rapidity with which the reforms took place was a result of the fact that this group 
with the mentality of CUP held almost unlimited authority of the state. The desperate 
economic and psychological condition of the Turkish public and the lack of any other 
authority they could adhere to, were also aspects that strengthened this group’s power.  
Of course, it must be stated that this elite of the last decades of the Ottoman Empire 
gradually transformed during the early years of the Republic.    
 Turkish modernization of the Republican era was based on the principles of 
Atatürk. From the establishment of the Republic until the death of Atatürk in 1938, the 
reforms he implemented were in accordance with these principles. It would not be 
possible to comprehend this modernization process without describing these principles 
and reforms. Atatürk’s reforms can be best summarized in the context of the six 
principles that forms the foundations of the doctrine known as Kemalism: reformism 
(revolutionism), republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, and etatism 
(statism).52 The first of these, is a principle that characterizes the whole Atatürk era; the 
newly formed Republic was in a constant state of reform and the rulers were promoting 
reform in political, social, juridical, educational and economic areas. The next principle, 
republicanism can be linked to the demands for constitutional monarchy in the last 
decades of the Ottoman Empire. However, the actual declaration of the Turkish 
Republic was on October 29, 1923, well after the abolishment of the sultanate on 
November 1, 1922. According to the Kemalist ideology, the Republic was the best form 
of government and a lot of emphasis was made on popular sovereignty which was an 
important element distinguishing a republic from a monarchy.53                   
 Although secularism was officially accepted on April 10, 1928, this idea had 
already entered the lives of the Ottomans with the reforms of the Young Ottomans and 
even more so with those of the Young Turks. This principle was strengthened and 
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insinuated into the society by the abolishment of the caliphate54 on March 3, 1924. Two 
years later, the government abolished the Mecelle (the civil code of the Ottoman 
Empire) and the shari’ah (the Islamic law) and adopted the Swiss civil code and Italian 
penal code in their place.55 The rulers also shut the Sufi orders, and prohibited by law 
worship at shrines and tombs, both of which influenced the everyday religious practices 
of the Turkish people. The secularist principle also interfered with the society’s mode of 
dressing. The fez was replaced by the hat and religious dress was prohibited in public. 
Furthermore, as a result of this principle, the Muslim lunar calendar was replaced by 
the Gregorian and Sunday instead of Friday was adopted as the weekly day of rest.56  
 As a Kemalist principle, nationalism formed the basis for the creation of an 
environment that would enable the germination of the other principles. Kemalist 
nationalism aimed to create a society whose loyalty belongs to the nation rather than to 
any form religious unity; this society takes the nation and citizenship as reference 
points. After all, the creation of the Republic was a nation and state building process.57 
The reflections of this principle could be seen in reforms in various spheres of life. The 
establishment of the Turkish Historical Society in 1931 and the Turkish Language 
Association in 1932 are examples of these reforms. However, the most important 
reflection of the nationalist principle is the language reform that involved the 
replacement of the Arab alphabet with the Latin one and the purification of the 
language of non-native linguistic elements. 
 With the Turkish National Independence War (1918-1922), the concepts of the 
‘public’ and ‘populism’ were introduced with the aim to get rid of the classes of the 
Ottoman society. Moreover, this principle was also directed at various ethnic groups 
who may have felt as if they were ‘the other’ due to the influence of nationalism; the 
goal was to do away with all of the differences resulting from class or ethnicity and to 
unify the society under one Turkish populace.58 Furthermore, the principle of populism 
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has affected the status of women; women of the Republic enjoyed more rights in 
various spheres of life.59  
 During the early years of the Republic when the reforms focused on political 
and social spheres, economic policy had been pushed to the background. Thus, 
etatism – the policy according to which the state takes responsibility for the areas of 
economy in which the private sector either does not have interest or is not able to 
succeed – became more prevalent in 1930s. Up to that time, the Turkish economy had 
been primarily based on imports and the very limited private sector of the war-torn 
country was not able to achieve much success.60 Following the Great Depression, the 
Turkish leaders realized the need to implement etatism and announced the first five-
year plan in 1933. In accordance with this plan, large-scale textile and steel plants and 
other factories were opened. However, although etatism provided some foundation of 
industrialization in Turkey, overall it did not result in an economic success.61  
 The main Kemalist principles and reforms that shape the modernization 
experience of the Republic of Turkey have been listed above. This unique process has 
had far-reaching consequences that continue to influence modern day Turkey. The 
reasons for this require some explanation. Firstly, the modernizing reforms were the 
envisagement of a minority who was fortunate enough to have gained relative power 
over the old elite as well as the masses. In fact, this was an elitist and state-led 
transformation. The ruling elite either completely ignored or undervalued the local 
social and cultural practices and knowledge.62 This was mainly due to this elite’s 
European perception of social reality. According to them, the Western civilization was 
superior in many ways and in order to succeed, Turkey had to completely Westernize. 
They viewed the Western value system and the modernization associated with this 
system, as universal. This is why anything local was disregarded or viewed as second-
rate. Another aspect of the modernization of this era is its top-down, radical and rapid 
nature. Unlike grassroots movements that emerge out of the demands of a 
considerable majority of the society, the reforms of the early Republican era had many 
authoritarian features63 and they resulted in a rapid and radical cultural change.64 
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Furthermore, their aim was a rupture with the Ottoman past and the reforms served to 
this end as well, as Fethi Keles explains:   
 
...modernization after the collapse meant a completely different thing: It meant a 
cognitive rupture from the past, a restarting of the history afresh, an untying of any 
and every knot that had links to anything Ottoman. The founders of the Republic 
defined the new Turkish identity in outright opposition to Ottoman identity. They 
declared their desire “to be admitted as full members of Western society in order to 
escape from the terrible position of being its pariahs” (Tonybee 1925, cited in 
Robins, 1996, p. 65). The Kemalist elite adopted an irrevocable attitude toward the 
disavowal and denial of Ottoman past.65    
 
The language reforms mentioned above as well as the establishment of the Turkish 
Historical Society were both in line with this aim to delink the Republic from its Ottoman 
past. However, time has shown that as the main beneficiary of the empire, it was not 
possible to sever all of Turkey’s ties with its past; exemplifying this is the recent 
discourses of ‘neo-Ottomanism’ that is dealt with in the third chapter. 
 Nevertheless, overall, the modernizing Turkish nationalist elite’s project has 
been successful in constructing a relatively modern, Western – all be it with 
authoritarian features – nation-state and producing a new political elite that was 
dedicated to all of the principles of the Kemalist ideology.66 These political elite came 
into existence under what is today the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP),67 the party 
founded by Atatürk himself. From Atatürk’s death in 1938 until 1950 his friend İsmet 
İnönü was the president. Despite the fact that in 1946 the transition was made from a 
single-party system to a multi-party system, the CHP has ruled as the sole party of the 
Republic until 1950 when Demokrat Partisi (DP)68 under the leadership of Adnan 
Menderes won the elections. This is generally considered as the first step in the 
democratization process of Turkey. However, the authoritarian elements of the early 
Republican era continued in the form of military interventions. For a long time, this 
democratization process as well as the modernization process of Turkey has been 
shaped by the interaction between these authoritative elements and liberal elements 
reflected in the voice of the unrepresented segments of society. Some academics have 
coined the product of this interaction as “New Turkey”69 and the journey that has led to 
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it as the “Turkey experience”70. These two concepts that related to recent model 
debates are explained in detail in the next two chapters; however, before moving onto 
these, the previous versions of the model debates are reviewed in the next section.            
 
2.2 THE HISTORY OF THE MODEL DEBATES 
2.2.1 The Turkish Republic as an Example  
  
Although a part of this chapter’s title is “the History of Model Debates”, it should be 
clarified that the debates had not always been as explicit as they have become in 
recent times; that is to say, the concept ‘model’ was not always directly stated. For the 
most part, Middle Eastern and North African leaders of the 20th century either directly 
referred to Atatürk and Kemalism as their source of inspiration or implemented similar 
modernizing reforms in their countries. Thus, a logical inference can be made that the 
modernizing reforms of early Republican Turkey were taken as a model by these 
leaders.           
Indeed, when the conditions of the region are taken into consideration, this could be 
interpreted as a natural development.  
Turkey’s relatively rapid rise from the ashes of a centuries old empire in the 
aftermath of serious blows to its national integrity and economy was a development 
that the rest of the former-Ottoman territories could not overlook. During the Late 
Ottoman Period, part of the Arabs in these territories had rebelled against the empire 
as part of the popular wave of nationalism. Soon after, these people understood that 
the European imperial powers (i.e. British and the French empires) that had supported 
them had other intentions as a result of which on April 24, 1920 with the Agreement at 
San Remo, Syria became a mandate of France; Iraq and Palestine became a mandate 
of Britain.71 Former-Ottoman territories in North Africa (i.e. Algeria, Tunisia and Libya) 
had already been invaded by the European colonial powers over the course of the 19th 
century. From this time until approximately the end of the World War II, nationalist 
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movements within these colonies and mandates increased in number and influence; 
hence leading one by one to independence from the late 1940s to 1960s.72   
During this era characterized by imperial land-grabbing, Turkey was taken as a 
role model by many of the nationalist and secularist/modernist groups in the region as 
a newly formed nation-state modernizing and westernizing impetuously.73 One of these 
leaders was Emir Khaled, the grandson of one of Algeria’s national heroes Emir Abdel 
Kader. Surely, before anything, Khaled – like many other nationalist Arabs – admired 
Atatürk’s nationalistic struggle against the Western Powers in World War I. 
Furthermore, Emir Khaled and the secular Algerians with whom he was acquainted 
were enthusiastic about Atatürk’s modernizing reforms. This enthusiasm continued with 
Khaled’s successor Ferhat Abbas,74 who was an active member of the nationalist 
organization, Young Algerians75. The Young Algerians looked up to Atatürk and his 
reforms. Their admiration of Atatürk’s reforms was especially true for the reforms that 
elevated the status of women in society: “...the new civil condition of Turkish women 
appeared to the Young Algerians as the realization of their own ideal...The triumph of 
secularism and the principle of equality between men and women (there) had a strong 
impression on Algerian Muslim youth whose admiration for the Kemalist regime was 
well-known...”.76 Other Algerian leaders that were reported to have admired Atatürk and 
his reforms were Malek Bennabi and Messali Hadj.77   
Another admirer of Atatürk was Habib Bourguiba, the postcolonial leader of 
Tunisian Republic, which he ruled for 30 years in the manner of a dictatorship. Often 
Bourgiba has been compared to Atatürk because of the similarity of their reform 
agenda. However, according to Rashid al-Ghannushi, the leader of the Tunisia’s 
Ennahda Movement, Bourguiba’s model of secularism was “more radical than 
Kemalism itself”.78 Bourguiba’s Tunisia resembled Atatürk’s Turkey in many ways and 
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even decades after the Kemalists of Turkey would praise the Tunisian regimes’ 
achievement in turning Tunisia into a secular and modern state. Indeed, when the 
Tunisian regime collapsed in 2011, it was said that the Kemalism of Tunisia failed.79 
According Mustafa Akyol, “[t]his, indeed, was the ‘Kemalist model’: a dictatorship by a 
secular cadre that took its legitimacy from a particular form of ‘modernization’ and that 
alienated conservative believers by both offending their values and repressing their 
freedoms.”.80    
The nationalist leader of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, was also influenced by 
Atatürk though not as much as Bourguiba. Nasser was devoted to creating a modern 
Egypt with a Western-style state and an industrialized booming economy. Like Atatürk, 
he was an army officer and like him, he used the military to achieve his goal. There 
were of course great differences between the two, but Atatürk was certainly a source of 
inspiration for Nasser.81       
In all of the examples above, one can see that some nationalist leaders of the 
Arab world were influenced by the principles and reforms of Atatürk in one way or 
another. Turkey of the time was considered an example in the eyes of these Arab 
countries that were fighting for their independence. Similar to the Turkish case, most of 
these leaders and the elites surrounding them equated modernization with 
westernization. This meant that their modernization processes also involved top-down 
radical measures that would undervalue local elements and thus discriminate large 
segments of their societies. Here, it is important to understand that though Atatürk’s 
Turkey may have constituted an example for these Arab leaders, there were other 
influences as well. After all, Atatürk’s reforms themselves were influenced by several 
models, particularly French and Soviet ones. This may be one of the reasons that there 
was no explicit reference to the phrase Turkish Model at this time. The closest thing to 
such a reference was arguments produced in the West regarding Turkey’s potential 
role as an example to the rest of the Islamic/Arab world. However, at this time, these 
arguments were mostly believed to be unrealistic and the Turkish experience was 
considered sui generis.82 Thus, at this stage, the accumulation of Turkish experiences 
with modernization that began in the Late Ottoman Period and continued well after the 
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formation of the Republic was only able to create the basis for future debates on 
Turkey’s quality of being a model.  
The first time the phrase Turkish Model was used was following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the emergence of the newly independent Turkic republics.  
 
2.2.2 The Post-Soviet Version of the Turkish Model 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the territories formerly 
occupied by the union gave rise to the emergence of quite a few newly independent 
states. Among these territories were parts of Caucasia and Central Asia, which were 
the historical homes of various nations of Turkic origin. The majority of these territories 
were still occupied by these Turkic peoples and thus the states emerging in these 
territories came to be referred to as Turkic republics. In this respect, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union became even more significant for Turkey. Accordingly, Turkey acted 
swiftly in adapting to the situation, recognizing these newly independent states in a 
matter of hours and opening up embassies in the course of a few days.83 The peoples 
of these states and Turkey had strong historical and cultural ties and both sides 
welcomed the new developments in the region.         
 On the other hand, adapting to this situation was not as easy for the majority of 
the world who were caught unprepared in the face of the collapse84 and the 
implications this event had on the world structure. Though the downfall of the Soviet 
Union meant victory for the Western block, the tectonic changes in the region reflected 
in the emergence of these newly independent states brought new concerns for the 
West (i.e. US and major European powers). The Western world was concerned about 
the supposed power vacuum that was created with the end of Soviet control in these 
territories. Turkey and Iran were considered as rival powers in this regard. The 
concerns of the West came from the fear that these newly independent states would 
look up to Iran whom they viewed as an oppressive fundamentalist Islamic state. 
Hence, as a role model, they presented Turkey “as an ideal Muslim democracy and a 
model of development especially for Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan 
and Azerbaijan”.85  
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 Many politicians, academics and members of the media in the West, in Turkey 
and the newly independent states, pointed to what they called the Turkish Model.86 As 
mentioned before, this was the first time the phrase Turkish Model was used. 
Compared to the early Republican era, the references to such a model were overt and 
the arguments seemed stronger. Moreover, it could be said that there was a general 
agreement about what the model is. Firstly, Turkey’s Muslim identity was significant as 
the Turkic republics were also Muslim majority states. However, the religious affinity 
feature was only welcome so long as it did not bear radical elements that could pose a 
threat to the West. In this respect, the secular and modern Turkish structure that 
Atatürk had established when he founded the state was critical for the understanding of 
the model. Furthermore, another feature of the model was Turkey’s close cooperation 
with the West. Following World War II, Soviet demands pushed Turkey into cooperating 
with the West. It was around this period that Turkey became a member Western 
international organization such as the NATO and CE. Over the course of the Cold War, 
these its connection with the West strengthened. Furthermore, not long after World 
War II, Turkey took a step in democratizing its political structure by adapting of a multi-
party system. This added to the formation of the West’s Turkish Model for the Turkic 
republics. Lastly, Turkey’s devotion to free market economy was a crucial feature of the 
model. A decade earlier, Turkey had taken measures to transform its economy though 
the fruits of this development would not be fully born until the 21st century, as such the 
Turkish economy set a good example for these Turkic republics that needed to be 
integrated into the global market.87           
 Indeed, there were many reasons why this version of the Turkish Model was 
thought to have real potential as a modernization project for these states. These 
peoples did not only have a similar religious background with the people of Turkey, 
they also shared ethnic and linguistic roots, which meant a relatively similar socio-
cultural background. For these reasons, it was assumed that the model would appeal 
to the Turkic republics. Thus, the West supported this pro-Western secular Muslim 
state model in order to eliminate the risk of these states transforming from anti-Western 
communist regimes into anti-Western Islamic regimes, taking Iran as an example in the 
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process. The aim was to avoid this and be able to integrate these states into the 
Western system – in fact, the West sought this for all the former-Soviet republics.88  
 For their part, the Turkish politicians saw this as an opportunity to reclaim 
Turkey’s significance for international political affairs in general and for the Western 
world in particular. The collapse of the Soviet Union had put an end to an era 
characterized by an ongoing ideological and military competition and a world divided 
into two oppositional blocks. Turkey had a strategic significance in this world structure. 
Now that this structure came to an end, Turkish policy makers were in search of new 
ways of claiming their legitimacy. Thus, Turkey reacted positively to the model debates; 
lending a hand to these newly formed states by providing loans, offering military 
assistance, opening schools, receiving exchange students, sending religious personnel 
and books and encouraging for a common alphabet.89 However, considering Turkey’s 
search for legitimacy, it is obvious that Turkish reaction to these model debates was as 
much a product of pragmatism as it was of idealism.                             
The concerns that led the Western powers to promote Turkey as a model were 
mainly results of a lack of knowledge concerning the region. In a few years’ time, the 
West’s knowledge about the actors, interests and dynamics in the region increased. As 
a result, they realized that its initial fears and assumptions were amiss. The first of 
these realizations was concerning Iran. Contrary to the first assumptions about Iran’s 
potential to be role model for the region, it was understood that Iran had very limited 
influence over the Turkic republics. This is mainly due to sectarian differences; Iran is a 
Shii dominated country while, all the Turkic republics with the exception of Azerbaijan, 
are Sunni dominated. In any case, it became obvious in time that Iran did not wish to 
pursue idealist politics but rather rational ones since it was searching for potential 
economic cooperation. Another realization was that Russia, who was no longer thought 
to have any interest in the region, reappeared in the picture with the launching of “near 
abroad” policy. There was no power vacuum to be filled after all. Having learned these, 
Western powers withdrew their initial support for the Turkish Model. What is more, 
Turkey’s had two important national problems – PKK terrorism and the dissatisfaction 
of the Alewites – that further decreased the popularity of the model.90  
Without the support of the West, the idea of a Turkish Model was unlikely to 
succeed. There is no doubt that Turkey’s quality as a model was more directly referred 
to in the post-Soviet version of the model debates, and the arguments for a Turkish 
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Model for the Turkic republics were stronger compared to the early Republican 
arguments. However, both this directness and strength were relative. Despite the 
liveliness of the model debates and Turkey’s efforts to strengthen relationships with the 
Turkic republics, it would not be incorrect to say that the strengths of the so-called 
Turkish Model had been inflated. On this issue, İdris Bal has stated that: “...it is difficult 
to interpret the West’s support as its confirmation of the Turkish Model’s maturity”.91 He 
adds to this point in the interview the author has conducted with him, saying that the 
Turkey of the time was not at a level of maturity where it could uphold the principles of 
this model.92 Rather, the term Turkish Model has been used as a symbol for these 
principles (secularity, free market economy, cooperation with the West and multi-party 
system).93 This is implied by Andrew Mango, the notable expert on Turkey, in his article 
titled “The Turkish Model”: “...relations [of Turkey] with the newly-independent Turkic 
republics...can yield benefits only in the context of Turkey’s wider relationship with the 
advanced industrialized nations. They alone can supply the capital and technology, 
which the Turkic republics need. With luck, Turkey may act as an intermediary or a 
partner in the exchange of Western money and know-how for Asian hydro-carbons and 
other raw materials.”.94  
Hence, while the post-Soviet version of the Turkish Model was better rooted in 
comparison to the earlier version, it was successful to the extent that it was supported 
by the West and thus its popularity decreased soon after this support ended. Several 
years after the ‘fall’ of this version of the model, events of September 11, 2001 
triggered a new set of model debates.  
 
2.2.3 The Post-9/11 Version of the Turkish Model  
 
On September 11, 2001, America experienced perhaps the most tragic attack within its 
territory throughout its history. The attacks have caused the death of more than 3000 
people and have had a traumatic effect on the American public. At the global level, the 
attacks opened up a new era in world politics characterized by an American pledge to 
destroy and defeat the global terror network with all that the US had at its disposal and 
by the effects of this pledge on other actors and regions around the world. In this 
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respect, the Middle East has become one of the focal regions that were affected by this 
pledge. All of the 19 attackers were from the Middle East – 15 of them from Saudi 
Arabia, two from the United Arab Emirates, one from Lebanon and one from Egypt. On 
the other hand, though none of the attackers was from there, first Afghanistan and later 
Iraq would be the two states that would pay the highest bills for the attacks. The former 
was found guilty of hosting and supporting Al-Qaida the organization that claimed 
responsibility for the attacks and the latter was accused, among other things, of having 
mass weapons of destruction and thus posing a threat to the security in the Middle 
East. In this process, the American government made it clear that they rest of the world 
was divided into two: those who were with and those who were against America. At 
that time, the US’s “ideological vulgarism” and disregard for international law and for 
the other dominant actors of the international system, did not only scare its enemies in 
the Middle East but also its traditional allies like Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt as well 
as European powers.95      
 In accordance with these developments, the general tendency of the post-9/11 
world was one of favouring security over freedoms. However, at this stage Turkey was 
going through what some refer to as a ‘reformation process’ characterized by 
democratization and the use of soft power – priorities that were quite contrary to the 
American perception of the world at the time.96 One of the most obvious characteristic 
of this reformed Turkey is the gradual increase in its relations with the Arab Middle East 
throughout the post-9/11 decade. According to Erman Akıllı, there are four reasons for 
the emergence of this new trend in Turkish foreign policy: the transformations in global 
and regional structures that began with the end of the Cold War era, the acceleration in 
EU-Turkey relations, changes in strategic perceptions and the AKP’s accession to 
power.97 Though Akıllı’s observations are well-said, this transformation needs to be 
seen in the broader framework of developments that started in the 1980s and that gave 
rise to the aforementioned “New Turkey” by the end of the first decade of the 21st 
century. These will be explained in detail in the next chapter; however, for the purposes 
of understanding the emergence of debates about Turkey’s role as a model in the post-
9/11 decade, it is important to know that Turkish foreign policy has changed from being 
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inward looking to being outward looking.98 In this period, Turkey’s image was more 
confident and independent than it ever had been in the past. The most evidential fact in 
this regard is Turkey’s refusal of the decision on the Iraq Bill of 2003. This bill gave the 
Turkish government the authority to send Turkish military troops abroad and to allow 
foreign military troops to remain in Turkish territory. Thus, it would have given America 
a head start in its war with Iraq. The fact that this bill did not pass, showed that the 
Turkish alliance with the US was not unconditional. 
 Some scholars have argued that this change in Turkish foreign policy outlook is 
also influenced by the power vacuum created in Turkey’s neighbourhood as the US 
engagement in the Middle East decreased during the post-9/11 era.99 These 
arguments may seem to contradict what has been said earlier about an assertive US 
foreign policy in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. This is not the case. After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, international security landscape gradually became more 
and more heterogeneous but it took the US foreign policy two decades to adjust to this 
new structure.100 The assertive and harsh US foreign policy in the immediate aftermath 
of the 9/11 attacks could be seen as part of the US’s rejection of this multipolar 
structure where its dominance is doomed to decrease. However, further on in the 
decade, these assertive policies decreased and the US started scaling down its military 
presence, eventually withdrawing from Iraq. The argument is that this scaling down – in 
addition to the decrease of EU’s soft power in Eastern Europe due to ‘enlargement 
fatigue’ – has opened room for Turkey to pursue a more active foreign policy in its 
neighbourhood.  
Interestingly, the increase in active Turkish foreign policy in its neighbourhood 
did not seem to bother the West; on the contrary, it could be said that this was 
promoted by Western powers. More specifically, the US promoted Turkey’s role as a 
model for its neighbourhood and especially for the Middle East. In a speech he gave in 
Istanbul following the NATO Summit in 2004, US President of the time George W. 
Bush, explicitly remarked on this, referring to the 150-year-old Turkish experience with 
democracy and social reform and declaring Turkey a model for the greater Middle 
East.101 The image of Turkey as a moderate Islamic, democratic model for the Middle 
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East has continued to be of importance in the current US President Barrack Obama’s 
democracy promotion efforts in the Middle East.102 Making his first presidential visit to 
Turkey, Obama has defined US-Turkey relationship as a ‘model partnership’. This 
could be interpreted as the new administration’s efforts to start a new dialogue with the 
Muslim world in the hope of repairing damaged relations of the past decade.103        
CHAPTER III: “THE NEW TURKEY” 
 
As stated in the introduction, one of the objectives of this thesis is to present the 
transformation of Turkey starting with the beginnings of the modernization process to 
the emergence of contemporary Turkey and situate the model debates within this 
transformation narrative. Accordingly, in the first part of the previous chapter, the 
Turkish journey of modernization has been explained in detail to provide the necessary 
background for the second part where some historical moments during which the 
debates that implicitly or explicitly refer to the Turkey’s role as a model, were explained. 
To a certain extent, these two parts together constitute the general reference point for 
the contents of this chapter. As part of the above-said objective, this chapter brings the 
transformation process to its final stage by explaining developments of the recent past 
that led to the New Turkey. This phrase, that has already been mentioned, is chosen in 
this thesis to represent the most recent product of this transformation process, which is 
the reference point of many that refer to a Turkish Model in the context of the Arab 
Spring. 
 Before one starts talking about a New Turkey, it is important to known clearly 
what is meant by the preceding one. The formation and contents of Old Turkey have 
already been partly mentioned in the previous chapter. The transformation from empire 
to nation has been a problematical process; though independence was gained, the new 
regime’s modernization project tended to disregard local social and cultural 
sensitivities. As a result, many segments of the society have been discriminated. While 
the structure of the empire had allowed for the coexistence of peoples from different 
ethnic, linguistic and religious backgrounds, the Kemalist nation-state could not be as 
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lenient.104 As the nation prospered and became stronger, so did the status of the 
Kemalist elite whose power depended on the extent to which the Kemalist principles 
were implemented. Thus, for decades there have been constraints on the segments of 
society whose ethnic, religious or ideological believes diverged from the framework 
envisaged by this elite. İhsan Dağı describes this Old Turkey as:   
 
The old Turkey was a country where people were suppose to serve and remain loyal 
to the state and satisfy the demands of the state elite. It was a country that existed 
for the state and its owners, i.e., the state elite. Citizens were commanded to be 
stripped of their ethnic, religious and even ideological identities. In the old Turkey, 
the nation was imagined to be homogenous despite the diversities on the ground. 
The old Turkey was based on a notion of the superiority of the state over the society 
– an understanding that gave a privileged status and power to the bureaucracy over 
the citizens, which is an anomaly by any democratic standard.105  
 
In the first decade of the new century, a set of comprehensive political, juridical 
and economic reforms have taken place. These reforms were the first events signalling 
a change in this Turkey that Dağı is describing. Of course, they did not happen abruptly 
and all at once. Each of these was the result of transformation processes, which began 
at different times in different spheres. These transformation processes are key to 
understanding the New Turkey. Hence, in this work, these processes – that have been 
mentioned separately and dispersedly elsewhere – are organized under four main 
categories outlined in the next four sections.      
 
3.1 The Emergence of “New Islamist Thinking”        
 
The first of these categories is the transformation of Turkish Islamism that found 
expression in the AKP. Religion came first amongst the local sensitivities that the 
Kemalist Republic had disregarded; this was mostly evident in the strict measures 
taken by the regime in the name of the secularist principle.106 Over the decades since 
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the establishment of the Republic, the segments that were affected by this – by no 
means a minority – came to a point of potential outburst in the 1940s. Afraid of losing 
the consent of the masses especially after the transition into a multi-party system, in 
1946 the CHP was forced to give way to Islamic elements in their discourses and 
policies. This was the first in a long time that religion was used for the political interests 
of the rulers.107 However, the masses did not find these late-coming gestures sincere 
and sufficient and elected the DP in 1950. With DP, religion was reinserted into Turkish 
politics. A decade later, the military in the role of the guardian of the state accused the 
DP of anti-secular activities and made the 1960 military coup.108  
By the 1970s, conditions were agreeable once again and the first religiously 
oriented political party emerged; this was Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP)109. Soon after, MNP 
was closed by the military and in 1972 Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP)110 was established 
under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan by the same political Islamist movement, 
National Outlook Movement (NOM).111 During the military coup of 1980, the MSP was 
closed down and many politicians from the right and left wings were arrested. In the 
aftermath of the coup, the military “[w]ithout changing the state’s promise of 
secularism” adopted “a notion called ‘Turkish-Islamic-synthesis’” against the threat of 
communism.112 Much like the CHP, the Kemalist military was also flexible enough to 
use religion as an instrument. In this environment, Erbakan was allowed to open 
another party, Refah Partisi (RP)113 in 1983 that had electoral successes at the 
municipal level in the 1990s. In 1995, the RP won the elections and formed a coalition 
government with the Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP)114. For a short period, Erbakan served as 
prime minister until he was forced to resign by the National Security Council (NSC) that 
accused his government of undermining secular rule.115  
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This event often referred to as the “February 28 Decisions” is the first of what 
has been mentioned in this work as the two postmodern coup d’états. The period 
during and following the February 28 Decisions was characterized by an increase in 
the oppression towards anything associated with Islam. It also marked a turning point 
in Turkish political Islam as it set the ground in which the “New Islamist Thinking” 
embodied in AKP, has emerged. The AKP was born out of the NOM and the heads of 
the party were mainly politicians from the RP. However, they differed very much from 
their predecessors. According Gamze Çavdar, the AKP was “the result of a process of 
political learning, defined as ‘a change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one’s 
beliefs) or development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of observation 
and interpretation of experience.’”.116 Thus learning from their experiences, the former 
members of the NOM in the AKP targeted a broad constituency, avoided references to 
religion and instead emphasized political and economic reform and EU membership.117 
As such, the AKP must have appealed to a majority of the public as it won the 2002 
elections with 34.29 percent of the votes.118       
 A prominent Turkish social scientist, Şerif Mardin has defined this new strength 
of political Islam under AKP, as the successful result of Kemalist reforms.119 There is 
truth in this seemingly paradoxical statement; it is the decades-long interaction 
between secularism and political Islam that has produced what some refer to as a sui 
generis experience of Turkish Islamism. There is one important aspect distinguishing 
this experience from its Middle Eastern counterparts: the relative political freedom and 
democratic elections that allow for the inclusion of Islamist movements in politics. It is 
argued that this aspect is one of the reasons that explain for the absence of terrorist 
elements in Turkish Islamism. However, this inclusion was only possible under the 
constant control of the state and the military.120 In time, these controls, have led to the 
emergence of a group among the political Islamists in Turkey who have chosen to 
moderate their discourses at an unprecedented degree: this was the case of AKP. 
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3.2 Towards the ‘Normalization of Civil-Military Relations’121 in the 21st Century 
Turkey     
 
The military has occupied an important place in the lives of the Turks for centuries. It 
already had a well-respected status before the establishment of the Republic and this 
continued in the Republican era. The founders of the Republic being of military origin, 
the new state attributed even more power to the military. From then until the first few 
years of the new century, the authority of the military has remained high. In fact, until 
recently, public surveys indicated the military as the most trusted institution in the eyes 
of the public. It is important to know however, that this trust never implied the public’s 
approval of the political role of the military.122 Nevertheless, the military – since the 
establishment of the Republic – has aimed “to influence political developments so as to 
eradicate all threats to the Turkish Republic, real or perceived.”.123 This is most 
apparent in the five military interventions that have occurred almost every decade: the 
direct coups of 1960, 1971 and 1980 and memorandums of 1997 and 2007.  
Truly, these interventions have greatly damaged civilian politics and the 
development of democracy and rule of law in Turkey.124 This is not an exceptional 
outcome for military interventions in general. However, quite different from what 
traditionally follows military interventions, in the case of Turkey, these interventions 
have not produced an officer who remained in power for decades, in other words, a 
dictator. Instead, the Turkish military has tried to maintain its influence through 
institutional channels such as constitutional amendments; hence, the post-military 
intervention constitutions of 1960 and 1982 in which the NSC was established and 
increased in authority, respectively.125 This could be seen as part of the self-appointed 
role of the military as the provider of the “checks and balances” on Turkish politics 
against the aforementioned “threats”.126 Under any circumstances, the military 
interventions were undemocratic and what is more, they demonstrated an increasing 
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inconsistency within the Kemalist ideology: This was the fact that though Kemalism had 
always aspired Turkey to be a part of the West, it simultaneously rejected some of the 
most fundamental European values. To be more precise, these military interventions – 
in the name of protecting Kemalist ideals – resulted in human rights violations and 
damaged the democratic structure of the state.127  
One could argue that this inconsistency was lost on the West prior to the fall of 
the Berlin Wall. To put it in another way, the global political conditions brought forth by 
the Cold War kept the West silent in the face of the interventionist policies of the 
Turkish military. The aforementioned inconsistency only started to become evident with 
“the emergence of deep principles of democratic governance as preconditions for 
membership in the West”.128 Not long after the AKP’s rise to power in 2002, the party 
started a campaign at the EU Copenhagen Summit of December 2002 that aimed to 
accelerate the EU accession process. It became clear that “a shallow democracy under 
military tutelage”129 was not compatible with the membership to the EU and reforms 
were required to meet the Copenhagen Criteria. Accordingly, in the summer of 2003, 
the government introduced two constitutional amendments otherwise known as the 
Sixth and the Seventh Reform Packages. The latter of these was significant for the 
beginning of the transformation in civil-military relations in Turkey because it limited the 
power of the NSC.130 Turning the NSC into a genuinely advisory body could be 
considered as the first step for the normalization of civil-military relations in Turkey. 
Reforms continued in 2004, when the State Security Courts were abolished and the 
military members of the Council of Higher Education and the Radio and Television High 
Council were removed.131  
With these reforms, the long-lasting and unquestionable authority of the military 
was challenged; the power structures of the civil and the military began to be 
transformed. The role that AKP and the EU membership prospects have had on 
initiating this transformation cannot be underestimated. However, other developments 
have helped and strengthened this long-awaited change in the civil and military 
relations towards normalization. According to Ahmet T. Kuru, the political power of the 
Turkish military was the result of the support of the military’s civilian allies in the 
judiciary, political parties and the media. Kuru claims that this support gradually 
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declined since 2007 when the military e-coup (i.e. the memorandum issued online) 
failed, the AKP won the elections by a long shot and succeeded in making Abdullah 
Gül, its second strongest leader, the president and the Ergenekon case was opened 
against some military officers and their civilian allies. In addition to these events that 
have weakened the military’s political influence and the power of its civilian allies, Kuru 
suggests that the rise of a counter-elite that is made up of a combination of pro-Islamic 
conservatives and liberal intellectuals have further weakened the military’s civilian 
allies.132 
 This normalization in civil-military relations is one of the most distinguishing 
characteristics between the Old and the New Turkey. However, it must be mentioned 
that despite the initiation towards change by the AKP’s reforms for full EU membership 
and the continuation of this change by the decline of the traditional civilian allies of the 
military, this process is far from complete. As this thesis is being written, the 
Constitution that the military junta of 1980 imposed is still in effect.             
 
3.3 Economic Transformation and the Emergence of a “New Bourgeoisie” 
 
As mentioned before, economy was not among the initial priorities of the newly 
established Republic and when it became a priority in the 1930s, it was in the context 
of a strong nationalistic bureaucratic state that had at its disposal a great deal of 
political and economic resources to reconstitute the society and economy. This state 
created a national bourgeoisie, who was dependent on the state to which it owed its 
existence. This was the reality shaping the state-business interaction for decades in 
Turkey. The state played an important role in this structure and import-substituting 
industrialization was adopted as the economic model. Of course, throughout the 
decades, efforts to liberalize economy existed along with those for politics however; 
they were not effective enough in breaking through the system.133 For instance, when 
Menderes came to power in 1950, though he “was committed to the demands of 
private business, the policy process was still characterized by the rules of rent-seeking 
and distribution of favors to friendly businessmen”.134   
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The most successful attempts at transforming the economy were made during 
the rule of the conservative Anavatan Partisi (ANAP),135 which dominated politics 
throughout the 1980s under the leadership of Turgut Özal. Indeed, Özal’s vision was to 
liberalize Turkey’s foreign trade in favour of an export-oriented industrialization model. 
As soon as he overcame the resistance of the military and the then President Kenan 
Evren, and receiving 45.2 percent of the votes in the elections, he started to put his 
plans into action; initiated the capital liberalization program that promoted the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises, reduced public spending and introduced 
value-added tax. Knowing that the transition to an export-oriented economy was 
expensive, the Özal government also tried to make this process as smooth as possible 
by providing financial incentives to promote export. As a result of these reforms, Turkey 
managed to increase its exports from $2.9 billion in 1980 to $12.9 billion in 1989 and 
thus bringing Turkey a step closer to its present level of economic growth.136 During 
this time, Turkish entrepreneurs gradually became more and more independent of the 
state and entered the international markets. In 1995, this liberalization was taken 
another step forward with the completion of a Customs Union with the EU.137                 
 In many respects, the economic policies of the AKP government have been 
considered as continuations of Özal’s reforms in their neoliberal features. Despite the 
AKP’s big success in the elections, its political position was extremely delicate; it was 
being carefully observed by the military, the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and the 
traditional economic elite that were made up of powerful family business 
conglomerates. What is more, the AKP was restricted by the international financial 
institutions’ economic prescriptions for the post-crisis, damaged Turkish economy. The 
AKP’s conduct in view of these was to emphasize liberalizing economic and political 
reforms with the ultimate aim of full EU membership and to strictly follow the IMF 
program. It avoided – as much as possible – giving any of these groups excuses for 
displeasure.138 At the end, it has become the most credited actor for the Turkish 
economic transformation that has turned Turkey into the world’s 16th largest economy 
and a member of the G20. On the other hand, it is only fair to say, “the fruits of Özal’s 
reforms were long in coming and the AKP today is their primary political beneficiary”.139                       
                                               
135
 Motherland Party (MP) 
  
136
 Karadag, “Neoliberal Restructuring in Turkey”, 14.  
 
137
 Ülgen, “From Inspitation to Aspiration”, 9. 
 
138
 Karadag, “Neoliberal Restructuring in Turkey”,  22-24. 
 
139
 Barkey, “Coordinating Responses”, 18-21. 
40 
 
  Without a doubt, the most important result of this economic transformation in 
Turkey has been the emergence of a new business community, known as the 
Anatolian Tigers, whose economic fortunes did not depend on their good ties with the 
government.140 The shift from an import oriented to an export oriented economic model 
must have kindled the inherent economic potential of Anatolia, “[a]s a number of 
Anatolian trading town centres, ranged along the old silk routes, have undergone an 
industrial revolution which has turned them into major manufacturing centres and 
players in the global economy”.141 In its report, the European Stability Institute has 
called this development an economic miracle and referred to this new bourgeoisie as 
the “Islamic Calvinists”. The reason for this was that this new group, unlike the old 
Istanbul-centred elitist state-backed business class, was “Anatolian-based, pious, 
conservative and market-oriented”.142 Indeed, this group’s economic success stands 
out as one of the reasons for arguments about the possibility of Islam and modernity’s 
coexistence.143           
On the one hand, the Anatolian Tigers themselves constitute a fundamental part 
of the counter-elite that Kuru mentioned earlier and on the other, they are the major 
financier of this new elite. In fact, the AKP derives much of its electoral and financial 
strength from this new economic class.144 One way or another, the emergence of a new 
middle class who has become increasingly influential in the economy, political society, 
the media and the judiciary is a reality that must be appreciated in order to fully 
understand the New Turkey.  
 
3.4 New Trends in Turkish Foreign Policy   
 
Foreign policy, like many other spheres, has also been affected by the sweeping wave 
of change in Turkey. Some of the changes in this sphere have been touched upon as 
part of the post-9/11 model debates (e.g. the increase in Turkey’s relations with the 
Arab Middle East, parallel to a decrease in US engagement in these countries). 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to go over the new trends of Turkish foreign policy, this 
time in the context of the concept of New Turkey. Since most of this period has been 
                                               
140
 Ülgen, “From Inspitation to Aspiration”, 9. 
 
141
 “Islamic Calvinists – Change and Conservatism in Central Anatolia”, European Stability Initiative, (Berlin 
– Istanbul: 19 September, 2005), 6.      
 
142
 Barkey, “Coordinating Responses”, 21. 
 
143
 “Islamic Calvinists”, 2.  
 
144
 Barkey, “Coordinating Responses”, 18. 
41 
 
dominated by the rule of the AKP government, these trends are very much related to 
AKP’s major foreign policy principles. The ‘zero problems with neighbours’ policy 
stands out as the most encompassing and popular of these policies. According its 
originator, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, this policy is based on developing as 
good relationships as possible with countries in Turkey’s nearby geography within the 
framework of principles such ‘security for all’, ‘political dialogue’, ‘economic 
interdependency’, ‘cultural harmony’ and ‘mutual respect’. Davutoğlu adds further that 
following this policy means focusing on areas of cooperation rather than differences of 
opinion and thus creating a trustworthy foundation enabling the solution of problems in 
the long term.145 
 As a part of this policy, Turkey’s relations with its neighbours in the MENA 
region experienced unprecedented changes in the last decade. Relations with Syria 
could be given as an obvious example of this. In stark contrast to the relations that 
almost came to a point of rupture in the 1990s, the two countries mended fences in the 
2000s by opening borders, minesweeping in the borders and starting a process of 
economic cooperation reflected in the increase of reciprocal trade volume and border 
trade.146 Similarly, it is possible to talk about a rapprochement with Iran in the last 
decade. Turkey’s relations with Iran meliorated with Turkey’s purchase of Iranian 
natural gas and the rise in mutual investments and trade volume.147 Moreover, the 
improvement of Turkey’s relations with MENA countries could also be seen from the 
policy of visa-liberalization with numerous countries in the region. In 2009, Turkey 
mutually lifted visa requirements with Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. In the same year, 
visa requirements for Saudi Arabia were also unilaterally lifted.148 Another principle that 
marks the New Turkey’s foreign policy is Davutoğlu’s concept of “strategic depth”. In 
this respect, in addition to the opening to the MENA region, the expansion to the 
greater African continent plays a significant role. In 2008, the African Union declared 
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Turkey as the continent’s strategic partner and the same year Turkey-Africa 
Cooperation Summit took place in Istanbul. Since then, Turk-African foreign relations 
continued with speed in the framework of what has been called the African initiative.149              
Here it is important to emphasize the influence of the economic transformation 
explained above and the new class that emerged as a result of it, in the shaping of 
contemporary Turkish foreign policy. According to Yasin Kaya, this new class, which he 
labels as the Neo-National Bourgeoisie (NNB), exhibits a developing tendency to 
expand to new markets. This tendency fuels the demands for the Turkish state to 
improve its diplomatic and institutional ties with the NNB’s desired investment locations 
(mainly in the MENA region). Kaya further argues that, the NNB’s “ideological-
discourse synthesis of Islam, Turkish nationalism and pro-capitalism” help determine 
these locations. In other words, the NNB’s spatial accumulation is shaped by its 
ideology. This ideology in turn, appeals to the Muslim-majority countries of the MENA 
region.150 In view of these, it would not be wrong to assume that the religious and 
cultural affinities of this new conservative and pious business community have an effect 
in their business orientations. Though this is certainly not the sole reason, it should not 
be overlooked in analyzing the contemporary foreign policy trend of developing better 
economic relations with the MENA region.          
  This transformation in Turkish foreign policy in the past decade has given way 
to various arguments having repercussions both at national and global levels. The first 
of these is the discussions about Turkey’s ‘axis shift’. On the one hand, this is seen as 
the result of the increase in political and economic relations with the MENA region and 
on the other, the relative slowing down of the EU membership process in the second 
half of the decade. In essence, it seems to have more to do with Davutoğlu’s 
philosophy of foreign policy which lies on the claim that “Turkey is a great power that 
has neglected its historic ties, diplomatic, economic and political relations with the 
Middle East, North Africa, the Balkans, and Eurasia, dating back to the Ottoman 
era.”.151 As could be seen from the trends that have been mentioned above, the AKP 
has acted upon Davutoğlu’s claim by portraying an active and confident foreign policy 
in these areas, which are in general the former Ottoman territories. In addition to the 
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‘axis shift’ arguments, this has brought about another argument; that of ‘neo-
Ottomanism’. Ömer Taşpınar explains this as a concept defining both the foreign and 
domestic policy trends of the New Turkey and provides three factors that demonstrate 
Turkey’s neo-Ottoman tendencies. These are the willingness to come to terms with its 
Ottoman and Muslim heritage, a sense of grandeur and self-confidence in its role in the 
world and its goal of embracing the West as much as the Muslim world.152 
 Although these tendencies have presented themselves in AKP’s foreign policy 
in the last decade, the AKP’s stance before arguments such as shift of axis and ‘neo-
Ottomanism’ has been rather critical. In a personal interview, Chief Foreign Affairs 
Advisor of the Prime Minister İbrahim Kalın, has regarded the shift of axis arguments 
as reminiscent of the “either or” perspective remaining from the Cold War era. Kalın 
explained that the fact that Turkey has been opening to other word regions and 
improving its political and economic relations with the Middle East, Africa, Asia and 
Latin America does not – in today’s global conditions – mean that it should give up on 
Europe. On the contrary, he added that Turkey’s relations with the EU are continuing at 
full speed and that more than half of Turkey’s foreign trade is still done with the euro-
zone.153 Similarly, Davutoğlu and other AKP members reject the concept ‘neo-
Ottomanism’ and instead prefer less disputed concepts such as ‘zero problems with 
neighbours’ or ‘unlimited cooperation’.154                         
 These arguments about ‘axis shift’ and ‘neo-Ottomanism’ may be contested but 
overall, the new trends explained above show that Turkish foreign policy of the last 
decade has experienced a dramatic change and is now defined as self-confident, 
assertive, active and multifaceted.155   
CHAPTER IV: THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE TURKISH MODEL IN THE CONTEXT 
OF THE ARAB SPRING 
 
In the previous chapter, the three different historical moments during which debates on 
Turkey’s role as a model emerged, has been explained. In the current chapter, the 
focus is on the recent re-emergence of debates on the Turkish Model. While there are 
many references to the characteristics of the Turkish Model and the transformation 
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process both of which have been explained, this chapter puts these in the framework of 
the Arab Spring. Its main aim is to pin point to the most prevalent perceptions and 
arguments regarding the Turkish Model. Before moving on these, a brief account of the 
contemporary history of relations between Turkey and the Arab World is given. This is 
intended to be helpful in explaining the appeal effect of the Turkish Model for the Arab 
world.      
 
4.1 A Brief History of Turkish-Arab Relations 
 
The Ottoman Empire had governed a great deal of the Arab lands for over 400 years. 
Most of these lands became Ottoman territory without major wars and some joined the 
empire voluntarily. Hence, the initial relations were based on amiable foundations. 
From the early decades of the 19th century when Ottoman withdrawal from Arab lands 
started, to the establishment of the Turkish Republic, relations between the two parties 
were mostly characterized by “mutual cooperation against imperialism under the 
spiritual authority of the Caliph”.156 However, during World War I, groups of Arab 
nationalists cooperated with the imperial powers against the Ottoman Turks, an event 
that came to be referred to as the “Great Arab Revolt”. The founders of the Turkish 
Republic used the revolt as a “propaganda tool of the official ideology during the 
formative period of modern Turkey for constructing negative images of Arabs”.157 The 
revolt was interpreted as widely-supported and anti-Arab sentiments were generated. 
These negative images were further reinforced by various instruments of the nation-
state; for example, in the textbooks of public schools Arabs were portrayed as traitors 
for many years.158 This policy of the Turkish Republic should be viewed in relation to 
both its efforts at nation-building and its desire to strengthen its links to the Western 
civilizations.159   
A series of events during the following decades, such as Turkey’s recognition of 
the state of Israel, worked to deteriorate the already strained relations. Turkey’s firm 
membership in the Western block during the Cold War era, moreover, produced 
negative attitudes towards Turkey among the Arab community. Nevertheless, relations 
showed small signs of recovery from the second half of the 1960s onwards, as a result 
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of Turkey’s reaction to the 1967 Israel-Arab War. The entrance of political Islam in 
Turkish politics, in the 1970s under the leadership of Erbakan, contributed to the 
recovery and this trend continued with Turgut Özal who developed good relations with 
Arab countries in the 1980s and then with AKP from 2002 onwards. In the decade that 
has passed since then, Turkish-Arab relations have experienced revolutionary changes 
as mentioned above in the context of the broader transformation process.  
Three events during this decade require special mention due to their 
significance in shaping contemporary Turkish-Arab relations and the recent model 
debates. The first of these is the refusal of the decision on the Iraq Bill of 2003 that has 
been explained in the last section of chapter two. The passing of such a bill would have 
meant war with a Muslim and Arab nation. Though this might not have caused conflict 
with some Arab regimes of the time, it would have definitely damaged the Turkish 
image in the eyes of the Arab peoples, who later on in the decade, constituted a large 
portion of the actors of the Arab Spring. The refusal of the bill on the other hand, 
symbolized the independence of Turkish decision-making in spite of Western interests. 
This added more prestige to the Turkish image. The second of these events is the 
heated discussion and the walkout of the Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan following his 
request for ‘one minute’ to finish his speech at the Davos Ecomic Forum in 2009. Here, 
Erdoğan’s assertive opposition to the Israeli President Simon Peres gained great 
admiration from the Arab peoples. The final event is the Israeli raid of the Flotilla Mavi 
Marmara which was carrying humanitarian aid to the besieged Gaza Strip on 31st May 
2010. This event where nine Turkish citizens lost their lives severely damaged Turkish-
Israeli relations. Moreover, this event had implications for the Turkish image in the eyes 
of the Arab peoples.   
In general, these three events indicated to the Arab people, the emergence of a 
New Turkey that was able to make its own decisions and hence, was more 
independent. This independence implied a kind of dignity, which the Arab people who 
have spent decades as mandates and colonies, have been yearning for. This desire for 
dignity is stated in one of the famous slogans of the Arab Spring – “bread, freedom and 
dignity”.160 Secondly, especially in the first of these events, Turkey takes a stand 
against the West which pampers the anti-Western/imperialist sentiments in the Arab 
world. Third but not least, in the last two events Turkey criticized and challenged Israel, 
which earned it the admiration of both the Islamist populations in the Arab world and 
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the Arab nationalists. In addition, Turkey’s support of the Palestinian cause has worked 
in the same direction. 
 
4.2 The Arab Spring and the Turkish Model  
 
As the Arab people’s movements spread throughout the MENA region at varying levels 
and speeds, the protestors’ basic demands seemed to remain unchanged; these all 
revolved around the long overdue desire to restore the will of the people over that of 
the states, which functioned for decades according to the interests of a certain 
estranged elite. Indeed, this was not the first time that the Arab peoples rebelled in the 
face of such injustice; these people’s movements of 2010 were similar, in some ways, 
to the Arab Revolutions in the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, the Arab Spring could be 
interpreted as a continuation of the process – though interrupted by several decades – 
where the Arab peoples demand their natural rights to a free, equal and humane life; a 
process which gradually came to be associated with democracy. This was partly what 
most of the revolutionary leaders had initially promised in the 1950s and 1960s but 
failed to carry out once they seized power. Instead, these leaders became dictators 
and the masses whose political and economic demands were ignored, were excluded 
from the system all together.161 
If one is to look at the contemporary Turkish history, similar demands for 
freedom and equality could be detected in the early decades of the Republic. At that 
time, the Turkish state had found itself forced to respond to these; hence, the shift to a 
multi-party system. This opened up the way for the representation of various, otherwise 
marginalized groups, in the political system. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, 
this process continued with economic transformation in the 1980s, which made it 
possible for these groups to be integrated into the economic system as well.162 
Throughout, the Turkish army and the bureaucratic elite constantly intervened in these 
transformations; however, the power of these traditionally dominant classes was 
shaken more than ever before, with the recent developments that altered the balances 
of power in Turkish society. Admittedly, despite these changes, even today, many flaws 
could be pointed out regarding Turkish democracy. However, relatively speaking, 
Turkey stands out as the least corrupt and most democratic state in the MENA region. 
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According to Mehmet Şahin, in essence, what distinguished the Arab 
experience from that of the Turkish, is the inability of the Arab regimes to integrate the 
masses into the country’s political and economic systems. Şahin draws attention to the 
fact that all the uprisings of the Arab Spring that led to regime-change, has taken place 
in republics rather than monarchies and explains this as the result of the fact that these 
were “republics without publics”; in other words, he claims that these republics were not 
true republics that prioritized the public.163 On the other hand, as explained in the 
previous paragraph, in Turkey, these masses have gradually been incorporated into 
the system; “the peripheries were brought to the centre”.164 Thus, despite its 
shortcomings, the Turkish democratization process, along with recent transformations, 
distinguishes Turkey from other states in the region. It also is one of the most 
significant aspects with regards to Turkey’s identification as a model for the MENA 
region.  
Knowing this, it becomes clearer to see why debates on the Turkish Model have 
re-emerged at the outset of the Arab Spring. In the introduction, it was stated that there 
is no single and definitive Turkish Model, rather the phrase is used by various actors, to 
conceptualize the present (and future) of the MENA region. In other words, rather than 
a definition, there are perceptions of what the model is or should be. At the beginning 
of this thesis, two aspects by which these perceptions are determined were proposed. 
First of these was the context in which the model is brought up; that is, the time and 
place in which it emerges and the event(s) it is associated with. This aspect has more 
to do with the diachronic dimension of model perceptions; that is to say, the different 
times in its history when Turkey was proposed as a model. In chapters two and three, 
the events that have led to the formation of such perceptions, have been explained as 
part of the modernization and democratization processes of Turkey. The second of 
these determining aspects was the “subject of perception”, the individual or group that 
perform the act of perceiving. To put it differently, the contents, functions and potentials 
of the Turkish Model change, depending on the interests, ideology or simply, the 
personal experiences of the perceiver. This aspect has been slightly treated in previous 
sections, but it is the main topic of this chapter. In what follows, based on sources from 
various think tanks in the field, academics, journalists and policy makers, various 
perceptions and arguments on the latest version of the Turkish Model are given.  
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4.3 On the Perceptions of the Actors in the Arab World 
 
Often in talking about the Arab world, one tends to fall into the error of assuming that 
this world and the peoples inhabiting it are homogenous entities, when in fact, the word 
“Arab” is an overgeneralization considering the variety of dialects, cultures and 
histories that these peoples have. The current work is written with awareness regarding 
the multiplicities that constitute these peoples. However, an attempt to reflect each and 
every difference in the numerous states in the MENA region, while at the same time, 
trying to provide the reader with a general idea of the perceptions about Turkey’s role 
as a model, is an extremely difficult task. For this reason, the author advises the reader 
to keep in mind this heterogeneity and the limitations of the categorization that is 
presented below.       
 Scholars have provided different categories to organize the diversity of Turkish 
Model perceptions. For this section, the categorization of Burhannettin Duran and Nuh 
Yılmaz is considered very helpful and therefore, has been chosen to explain the 
perceptions of the actors in the Arab World. This narrative is particularly significant as it 
shows how the Turkish model appeals to seemingly contrasting groups. Here, Duran 
and Yılmaz, have divided the Arab perceptions under three categories. 
 The first of these categories is mainly made up of the ruling classes of the Arab 
Spring countries. According to them, their people are not mature enough to adopt 
democracy on their own and so the transition to a democratic regime requires state 
control. Thus, for this group – as for as the previous generation during the early 
Republican era – the Turkish Model is significant as an example of “controlled 
modernization under military tutelage”.165 However, in the 21st century it has become 
more difficult to oppress segments of the society, which is another reason the Turkish 
Model is appealing to this group; Turkey’s successful “integration of Islamist actors in 
the political system”166 may be just what these groups need, in order to continue their 
rule without having to surrender too much of their power.  
 As their second category, Duran and Yılmaz present the Islamist movements in 
the MENA region. The Ennahda Movement of Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood of 
Egypt are included in this group. The group mainly views the Turkish Model as “a 
successful reconciliation of Islam with democracy, rule of law and economic 
development”.167 For them, the last 10 years of Turkey seem to define most of what 
they understand as the Turkish Model. Clearly, they equate this model with the AKP 
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and the recent transformation in political, economic, judiciary fields. This is evident in 
Ennahda leader Rashid al-Ghannushi’s remark, “[t]he best model I can think of is the 
one adopted by the AKP...in Turkey”.168 Shortly before the Arab Spring, another reason 
that increased the appeal effect of the Turkish Model for this group, presented itself in 
the form of tension between Turkey and Israel. The Davos incident and the Flotilla raid 
showed that Turkey had become a prominent and independent regional actor that 
could criticize Israel. This new trend in Turkish foreign policy won more admiration from 
the Islamist movements in the Arab world.169 In addition, it must be mentioned that the 
shared Ottoman past is a crucial aspect in shaping the group’s perceptions. In fact, the 
new Foreign Minister of Tunisia, Rafik Abdessalem, stressed this during his first official 
visit for which he chose Turkey.170 
 The final category that Duran and Yılmaz give is the people in the streets of the 
MENA. This group aspires to liberal aspects of Turkey, like its liberal political life and 
democratic transition. Moreover, economy is especially important for this group, as the 
key to improving their standards of living. Seeing Turkey’s economic boom in the last 
decade gives them hope in this regard.171 Here, it is worth mentioning the role of 
Turkish cultural exportation, in influencing these people’s perceptions regarding Turkey 
and its capacity to be a model for the MENA. As one result of the transformation that 
Turkish economy has experienced in the last decade, Turkish TV sector has branched 
out, reaching audiences ranging from East Europe and the Balkans to Central Asia and 
the Middle East. For the Arab peoples, what makes Turkey important in this regard, is 
its ability to incorporate Islamic and cultural values into their, otherwise Western and 
modern scripts.172  
 Verily, for each category above the Turkish Model connotes different sets of 
meanings. However, it must be stated that the perceptions of these categories are not 
devoid of concern regarding a Turkish Model. Scholar Emad Y. Kaddorah, argues that 
the admiration that the Turkish Model inspires is limited, depending on the interests 
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and concerns of each actor.173 For the first group, the integration of Islamist segments 
into the system may bring about risks that they do not want to take, such as the political 
victory of these groups at the expense of their political dominance. The second groups 
of actors, is particularly concerned about two aspects of the Turkish Model; the secular 
state structure and close relations with the Western powers. They believe that these 
characteristics do not conform to their Muslim-Arab identity.174 The final group is 
hesitant about the Turkish Model due to the still relatively prevalent role of the military 
in the system.175 Taking these into consideration, Kaddorah’s claim that the Turkish 
Model is both a source of inspiration and apprehension, seems plausible.  
 
4.4 On the Western Perceptions 
 
It is argued that the discussions about Turkey’s role as a model originated not in 
Turkey but in the West and particularly, the United States.176 For this reason, it is even 
more significant that Western perceptions are analyzed here. As it was with the 
previous classification, “the West” is also an overly general term of reference and 
naturally, within this large category, there are diversifying perceptions about the model 
debates. Here, these are narrowed down to the most dominant ones – those that best 
reflect the ‘official discourses’.  
 Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US remains as an unchanged 
actor in the making and re-making of all the theses about the Turkish Model. This could 
be seen from the section on post-Soviet and post-9/11 model debates in chapter two. 
Throughout the first decade of the 21st century, high-level US officials have frequently 
pointed at the role of Turkey as a model for the countries in its neighbouring regions. 
Indeed, sometimes, they have gone so far as to claim that Turkey presented a model 
beyond its immediate reach; former President of US, George W. Bush had claimed that 
Turkey “provided Muslims around the world with a hopeful model of a modern and 
secular democracy”.177 Following the 9/11 attacks, the Middle East has made it into the 
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list of regions that could ‘benefit’ from the Turkish Model and with the occurrence of the 
Arab Spring, North Africa has also been added.  
Up to now, a lot about how the West perceives the contemporary Turkish Model 
have already been indirectly stated in previous chapters. The following quotation by 
President Gül could be treated as good summary of these: “Turkey’s role in a changing 
Middle East environment is a function of what it represents in this volatile geography as 
a European, democratic, and secular country that is attached firmly to the principles of 
a free-market economy and has valuable and unique experience in implementing 
reforms, modernity, and regional cooperation.”178 Most of the characteristics that Gül 
lists, refer to Turkey’s Western identity and its connection with the West. However, 
these only reflect one side of the Turkish Model that the West promotes. In addition to 
these, what the Western powers perceive as the Turkish Model, is a Muslim-majority 
country with strong cultural and historical roots in the East; the heiress of the Ottoman 
Empire. This quality bestows upon Turkey a kind of soft power that the West cannot 
even hope to achieve.179 This indeed, is the first reason for the Western promotion of a 
Turkish Model.   
The second reason that shapes Western perceptions about the significance of a 
Turkish Model is Turkey’s record of relations with a variety of actors in the MENA. At 
the outbreak of the Arab Spring, the West found itself in a situation where its 
addressees in these post-Revolution countries were groups it had formerly dubbed as 
“terrorists” at worst, and “fundamentalists”, at best. Neither the US nor the EU had 
established any diplomatic or other formal relations with these groups priorly. In this 
respect, Turkey stands out as an important actor as Ibrahim Kalın explains: “...Turkey’s 
policy of engaging various actors in the Middle East – repudiated by some as 
controversial, extreme and even terrorist – has played a significant role in bringing at 
least some of these forces into mainstream politics. Given the new political realities in 
Egypt, Tunisia and the Palestinian territories, as well as in Lebanon, Libya and 
elsewhere, the more important of these actors are no longer secret or illegal 
organizations.”180 As Ennahda and Muslim Brotherhood now play an important role in 
shaping Arab politics, Turkey may act as a mediator, as an ally of both the West and 
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the Islamist movements in the MENA.181 So, the West perceives the Turkish Model in 
light of these.      
 In fact, Turkey’s role of a mediator between the West and the MENA has also 
triggered various arguments about Turkey-EU relations in the aftermath of the Arab 
Spring. Most of these arguments revolve around Turkey’s good relations with the 
countries in the MENA and the significance of this for the EU, whose relations with the 
region have been rather poor. According to Arthur Adamczy, the EU has not at all been 
interested in introducing democratic change in the MENA; on the contrary, EU 
politicians “turned a blind eye to the dictators” in the region.182 With the Arab Spring, 
most of these dictators have been overthrown and the EU has been left to interact with 
the Arab publics. Some scholars and policymakers, who have evaluated this 
interaction, found EU’s reaction to the Arab Spring unsuccessful and drew attention to 
the necessity of better cooperation with Turkey. While a considerable number of 
Turkish scholars have argued for the re-vitalization of EU-Turkey relations.183 Of 
course, the stance that scholars and policymakers take concerning this last point is 
very much dependent upon their position on Turkey’s EU membership.            
Another set of arguments regarding Western perceptions of the Turkish Model 
has to do more with the US’s strategic partnership with Turkey. The argument goes 
that, Turkey’s close links with the West sends the message that the West can also be a 
friend to the Muslims. Thus, the adaption of Turkey as a model by the countries in the 
MENA is promoted on the grounds that, it would eventually improve US’s relations with 
these countries. Former US Defence Secretary William Cohen refers to this point when 
saying Turkey could send “a very important signal to the rest of the Muslim world that 
the United States is not-anti Muslim as so many have thought we have been, but rather 
here is a very strong Muslim nation that is working hand in hand with the United 
States”.184  
Up to now, the arguments presented above, are those implying that the Turkish 
Model has positive connotations for the West. However, similar to the apprehensions of 
the Arabs explained in the previous section, the West also has concerns regarding 
Turkey’s role as a model for the Middle East. According to Kaddorah, one such 
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concern is to do with AKP’s sincerity about its moderate Islamic, secular and 
democratic appearance. He further explains that some segments of the Western, and 
especially American, society fear that AKP is waiting for the right opportunity, after 
having gained enough power, to implement its real agenda: increasing Islamic 
orientation.185 A similar concern like exhibited among the traditional secular elite of 
Turkey, who go a step further and claim that the AKP would bring shari’ah. Ironically, 
Turkey’s soft power in the MENA region – mentioned above as a point that makes the 
Turkish Model more advantages in the eyes of the West – also has the potential to put 
the West in an uneasy spot. However, this does not pose a threat so long as Turkey 
remains an ally of the West. According to Kaddorah, this is why the West is wisely 
managing its relations with Turkey and supporting the Turkish Model, which may be its 
best option for the time being.186  
 
4.5 The “Demonstrative Effect” Argument 
 
One argument that stands out, among attempts to explain the interest of Arab and non-
Arab actors in a Turkish Model, is the “demonstrative effect” thesis. Samuel P. 
Huntington referred to the concept this for the first time, in his work on the third wave of 
democratization. The term was used to explain the process by which democratic 
transition could occur. Huntington’s main argument was that “the example of earlier 
transitions provided models for subsequent efforts at democratization that in turn 
provided models for other efforts, and so forth.”187 In his article titled “Turkey’s 
‘Demonstrative Effect’ and the Transformation of the Middle East”, Kemal Kirişçi 
applies this concept to explain the ‘demand’ (coming from both Arabs and Westerners) 
for the Turkish Model for the Arab world.188 Simply put, Kirişçi argues that what makes 
the Turkish Model meaningful for the peoples in the MENA is its quality as an example 
of democratic transition, which provides a model for the democratic transitions in their 
countries. 
 According to Huntington, the most powerful form of demonstrative effect is that 
of a regional actor. So, the Turkish experience with democratization is especially 
important for the transitions in its region. However, though its geographical proximity 
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gives it a comparative advantage,189 this alone, is not sufficient in explaining why 
Turkey’s demonstrative effect is more significant than other transitions. In this regard, 
Kirişçi proposes that Turkey’s demonstrative effect is a function of three developments: 
Turkey’s rise as a “trading state”, the emergence of Turkish democracy as a “work in 
progress” and the transformation of Turkish foreign policy. The first and the third of 
these developments are significant because they increase Turkey’s visibility and 
significance in the region. They have already been explained in other parts of the thesis 
but the second development deserves more explanation. Referring to the Turkish 
democracy as a work in progress, means that Turkey’s democratic transition is 
incomplete. At first sight, this may present itself as a disadvantage, a flaw in the model. 
However, what Kirişçi argues is that this ‘deficiency’ of the modal is exactly what makes 
it attractive for the countries in the region, simply because they can relate to this model 
more than other Western examples, that may appear too idealistic and far-fetched.190  
 Another reason that explains the relative advantage of the Turkish Model and its 
demonstrative effect is the “cultural affinity” argument. Apparently, the shared cultural 
elements make Turkey a more attractive model and its democratization process more 
relevant, for the peoples of the MENA region. The role of a shared religion needs 
special emphasis here; the Turkish Model is inevitably more relevant than models of 
non-Muslim countries. Additionally, the fact that a party with roots in political Islam is in 
power in Turkey, reinforces the role that cultural affinities may play in shaping the Arab 
people’s perceptions about the Turkish Model.191 
 
4.6 The “Arab Spring as a Hegemonic Project” Thesis 
 
With the aim to enrich the perspectives on the various perceptions of the Turkish 
Model, another set of arguments – from among the large crowd of debates that 
emerged at the outset of the Arab Spring – is presented in this section. This 
argumentation, which reflects a more critical line of thinking towards the uprisings, 
could be referred to as the “Arab Spring as a hegemonic project”192 thesis. In fact, 
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several prominent journalists, regional experts and policy makers193 have adopted this 
argumentation in their explanations regarding the Arab Spring and the Turkish Model. 
In a nutshell, the rationale behind this line of thinking is that the US is the hegemonic 
power who plans – as part of its “Greater Middle East” initiative – and manages the 
events that have come to be labelled as the Arab Spring. The debates about a Turkish 
Model for the Arab Spring, are viewed in this framework and all the recent events are 
regarded primarily as results of external forces, rather than internal dynamics.194  
Mustafa Kutlay and Osman Bahadır Dinçer, have co-authored an article 
analyzing these arguments in detail. Here, they first present the two main assumptions 
that such arguments are based on, and then, deconstruct them. The first of these 
assumptions is ‘the sole hegemonic power in the world and the only mastermind that 
could control all that happens is the US’. For Kutlay and Dinçer, this assumption is 
actually based upon a more popular and controversial assumption about whether the 
US is a hegemonic power or not. Accordingly, they first go about defining what a 
hegemonic power is, based on the theories of Antonio Gramsci and Susan Strange. 
Pointing at the increasing debates about the decline of American hegemonic power in 
the last decade, the two conclude that it must first be answered whether or not the US 
possesses the qualities of a hegemonic power in the Middle East.195  
The second assumption that Kutlay and Dinçer claim these arguments are 
based on, is that ‘the masses in the region are not subjects who can exhibit any will of 
their own, but objects who are directed within the process’. According to the authors, 
this assumption resembles an Orientalist and elitist perspective, which devalues the 
capability and capacity of the peoples of the MENA to be the master of their own 
destiny. It implies that young Bouazizi who burnt himself in Tunisia, the hundreds of 
thousands that protested against the regimes in various Middle Eastern countries, and 
the thousands of Syrians who continue their struggle at the expense of their lives, are 
all passive individuals who merely play the role the US has chosen for them. In the 
opinion of the authors, this is a serious and degrading accusation.196  
The conclusion that Kutlay and Dinçer arrive at, is that both of these 
assumptions prove to be methodologically and normatively problematic. There is no 
doubt that the US is a global power who is greatly influenced by the events in the 
Middle East and who aspires to manage these events. However, arguments, that 
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position the US as the sole and all-powerful architect behind the events that mobilized 
thousands of people in the Middle East, seem to lack thorough analyses. In fact, 
according to Kutlay and Dinçer, such argumentation may work to ‘re-produce the 
hegemony of the centre, in the periphery’ and objectify the individual who makes the 
analysis.197 
 
4.7 The ‘Turkish Official Discourse’ 
  
As debates about Turkey’s role as a model for the MENA emerged, Turkey’s reactions 
to the events in the Arab World gained more significance. However, Turkey had been 
as unprepared for the new developments in the region, as any other world power. Its 
first reactions, such as its silence at the start of the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt or its 
initial objection to a ‘no fly zone’ and any form of military intervention in Libya, were 
viewed quite critically by observers. Indeed, Turkey’s reactions were a result of the 
form that Turkish foreign policy of the last decade had taken, and these revealed two 
important aspects about this policy. First, the ‘zero problems with neighbours’ policy 
seemed, in fact, to be more like ‘zero problems with regimes’. In other words, there has 
certainly been a change in Turkish foreign policy towards better relations with the 
neighbouring countries, but this change was rather based on maintaining the status 
quo. Thus, the recent developments in the Arab world deeply influenced Turkish 
foreign policy. Secondly, it became evident that this policy was extremely dependent on 
the economy. Turkey’s relatively recent economic success largely depended on 
exportation. As a result, Turkish commercial interests and investments had 
considerable effect on the formation of Turkish foreign policy. This also explained 
Turkey’s ‘turn to the East’; increase in trade and bilateral agreements with the MENA 
countries as well as its liberal visa policies. However, with the Arab Spring, the 
instability in the region put short-term Turkish economic interests at stake.198                      
 In later stages of the uprisings, the reluctant stance of Turkish policy makers 
was replaced by one of appropriation; the discourses of the officials focused more on 
commonalities and expressed outright support and commiseration. During this time, the 
responses of the Turkish policy makers towards the newest debates on Turkish Model 
took a more distinct shape. The following paragraphs aim to provide an account of 
these responses and by doing so, present, what the author refers to – from this point 
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onwards – as, the “Turkish Official Discourse” on the Turkish Model that emerged in 
relation to the Arab Spring. It is considered that the formal statements of high-level 
government officials reflect the official policies of the state, hence, the usage of the 
word ‘official’. In the following narration, such statements are provided for purposes of 
exemplification but the main arguments are mostly based what has been deduced from 
the interviews conducted.    
 The most distinct characteristic about the Turkish Official Discourse is its 
reluctance to use the phrase ‘Turkish Model’. This has to do with the connotations of 
the word ‘model’. In an interview with the author, Talip Küçükcan, has pointed at some 
of the implications of the usage of this word. Firstly, Küçükcan sees a model as a 
“fixed” and “essentialist” term that may not be helpful in analyzing Turkey’s exemplary 
role, which exhibits a constant state of change since the establishment of the Republic. 
He stresses the significance that certain experiences of Turkey may have for the Arab 
countries, however, suggests that the word ‘model’ must be given a more flexible 
character. Secondly, Küçükcan claims that talking about a model to be adopted from 
one country to another, would be to “force sociology and politics”. He explains his point 
by referring to the difference between the socio-political conditions of the Arab world 
and those of Turkey.199 The Turkish policy makers are aware of the implications that 
Küçükcan mentions, and they try to avoid the use of the word ‘model’. Instead, they 
define Turkey’s quality of being a model using various other words. One prominent 
example is Prime Minister Erdoğan’s preference of the phrase ‘source of inspiration’. In 
fact, Erdoğan started to refer to Turkey in this way earlier in the decade: “It [Turkey] is a 
democratic, secular Republic, with a market economy and where the majority of the 
people are Muslims. In that sense, it is a source of inspiration for the peoples of the 
region that wish to see modernization, pluralism, democracy, the rule of law, 
fundamental rights and freedoms in their own countries.”200 In the aftermath of the Arab 
Spring, Erdoğan continued to define Turkey’s role as that of a source of inspiration and 
an example. Foreign Minister Davutoğlu has also indicated his acceptance of these 
phrases during an interview. Upon a question on the basic philosophy behind Turkey’s 
approach to the Arab Spring, Davutoğlu expressed the Turkish state’s 
acknowledgement that, ‘a certain model’ could not form a template for any other 
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country since each country in the region had their unique conditions.201 In fact, this 
acknowledgement is another prevalent characteristic of the Turkish Official Discourse.                
 At a later section in the interview, Küçükcan adds one other implication that 
renders the usage of the word model, dangerous: this is its patronizing connotations.202 
This point is also mentioned by another interviewee, Mehmet Şahin. Küçükcan and 
Şahin both refer to the colonial pasts of the Arab countries in the MENA and explain 
that other actors must be extra cautious in their approaches and that the word ‘model’ 
is not sensitive in this regard.203 The architects of the Turkish Official Discourse seem 
to understand this fact very well and formulate their discourses accordingly. Erdoğan’s 
insistence on the fact that Turkey “...never interfered in the internal affairs of any 
country, nor would it do so in the future.”204 Such statements of Turkish officials can be 
interpreted as part of an aim to reassure the Arab world of their good intentions. 
Moreover, President Gül and Erdogan, as well as officials from AKP have even stated 
that Turkey did not intend to be a model for any country.205 An interesting point of 
relevance is that, could be the argument that ‘model debates are Western in origin’ –an 
argument that all five interviewees have made. Indeed, the Turkish officials’ avoidance 
of the use of the phrase ‘Turkish Model’ clearly reinforces this argument.206  
 Despite these statements however, Turkish officials still argue that Turkey may 
have a lot to present to the countries in the MENA. An important argument in this 
regard is that Turkey’s experience with modernization and democracy could be helpful 
in these countries’ transitions to democracy. Mehmet Şahin refers to this as the “Turkey 
Experience”, which he argues, deserves to be taken into consideration by the Arab 
world.207 Many other academics and policy makers also refer to the lessons that could 
be derived from Turkey’s experiences as well as mistakes. In the “25th Annual Abant 
Meeting: The Future of the Middle East after the Arab Spring”, intellectuals, including 
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President Gül’s Middle East Adviser Erşat Hürmüzlü, stated that Arabs are welcome to 
learn from Turkey’s experience.208  
In short, neither Turkish officials nor intellectuals have completely disregarded 
Turkey’s role as a model for the region; however, they are particularly careful when it 
comes to vocabulary. Although Turkey had been criticized for its initial reluctance for 
change in the region, the caution with which it proceeded may not necessarily be 
disadvantageous.  Turkey’s prudent attitude towards the Turkish Model may have 
avoided offending the Arab countries and even increased the appeal effect of a Turkish 
model. 
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis emerged from the general assumption that a new set of debates regarding 
the Turkish Model emerged at the start of the uprisings that began in 2010, in Tunisia 
and spread throughout the MENA region – developments that are otherwise known as 
the Arab Spring. These debates were considered to be a continuation of a larger and 
older accumulation of model debates that extended back to the initial decades of the 
Turkish Republic. In other words, the discourses revolving around a Turkish Model 
have been present since the establishment of the Republic, but only gained momentum 
at certain historical moments. Interestingly enough, despite the ever-growing literature 
on the Turkish Model, especially following the Arab Spring, there is yet to be an 
extensive academic historical survey of the model debates. This thesis is a modest 
attempt to fill this gap by providing an analysis of the conceptual debate on Turkey’s 
role as a model.      
 As demonstrated throughout the text, each time model debates were bought up 
in the course of history, they were situated within a specific socio-political conjuncture, 
which determined their substance as well as their dominance. During the initial 
decades of the Republican era, Turkey’s journey to independence and the Turkish 
modernization process have been looked upon as a model by the Arab nationalists that 
aimed to decolonise and modernize their countries. However, there was no direct 
reference to a Turkish Model at that time. Besides, the Western world did not regard 
the Turkish experience as repeatable and thus any debates regarding Turkey’s quality 
of being a model, were found unrealistic. This view changed following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, when the Western powers systematically supported a Turkish Model 
for the newly independent Turkic republics. This time, there was direct reference to a 
Turkish Model and thus, the model debates were more dominant. However, as the 
West’s support for the model declined, these debates lost their dominance.  
In 2001, another significant moment in the history of Turkish Model debates 
occurred with the September 11 terrorist attacks. At various occasions throughout the 
period following the attacks, the Western world presented Turkey as an ideal model to 
be followed by other Muslim countries. This, along with transformations in Turkey’s 
domestic and foreign policy, had increased the dominance of debates about Turkey’s 
role as a model, in the academic and media circles. It was in this environment that the 
Arab Spring occurred and triggered the re-emergence of debates on the Turkish Model, 
with greater dominance than ever before.     
As part of the aim of this thesis, these historical moments when debates on the 
Turkish Model has emerged, have been narrated chapters two and three. More 
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importantly, in doing this, first a historical account of the Turkish Modernization starting 
from the Late Ottoman Period have been given. This narrative that took the reader 
several decades into the Republican era, was continued in chapter three with the 
narration of the unprecedented rate of transformation Turkey went through in the 
2000s. These transformation processes that have resulted in the formation of a New 
Turkey, which is mainly the Turkey that has been the point of reference in the most 
recent debates about a Turkish Model. In other words, just as the narrative of Turkey’s 
modernization process had set the background for the three historical moments of 
model debates; the description of the transformation processes leading to the New 
Turkey, provided the conditional setting in which the model debates in relation to the 
Arab Spring emerged.  
In the fourth chapter, the main aim was to demonstrate various perceptions 
about the Turkish Model. The main characteristics of the Turkish Model had already 
been given in the introduction and explained throughout the other chapters. Thus, this 
chapter only referred to these and exemplified what has been referred to as 
‘perceptions’ up until that point. Here, the reader was presented with, what is 
understood by the Turkish Model by varying actors and what sorts of arguments and 
theses were raised in this process. In other words, in this chapter the reader was 
shown the perceptions about the Turkish Model that existed simultaneously and 
consequentially.  
Overall, in accordance with its aim, the thesis both presented a diachronically 
organized set of perceptions that changed throughout the history of the model debates, 
depending on the specific context that each debate emerged in; as well as, a 
synchronically organized set of perceptions, that showed differing perceptions on the 
Turkish Model, within the same timeframe. By doing so, the initial assumption that 
there is no fixed Turkish Model, has been demonstrated and proven to be correct. In 
other words, it has become clear that though the “Turkish Model” exists as a discursive 
reality, it becomes problematic to define concretely, as various actors use and abuse 
the model in accordance with their individual interests, aims and ideologies. In a sense, 
this makes the Turkish Model more like an instrument than a model to be adopted for 
its own sake. But again, considering the novelty of the events in the MENA and the 
model debates that emerged in this context, this is an argument that ought to be put to 
the test of time and further academic research.          
 In fact, the research conducted for this thesis has revealed a considerable 
capacity for potential research topics, which, due to this thesis’ limitations of time and 
space, could not be explored within this work. As a result, restrictions concerning 
perspective had to be made; as part of these restrictions, there has not been sufficient 
62 
 
focus on the Arab perspectives on the model debates. Even though some Arab 
perceptions concerning a Turkish Model were provided in chapter four, these were not 
sufficiently detailed and in-depth. Moreover, because of linguistic barriers, texts in 
Arabic could not be used and a very limited number of primary sources from the MENA 
region were made use of. This inevitably leaves out a great deal of potentially useful 
information. As Ülgen has rightly point out “the utility of the Turkish Model depends in 
large part to whether the recipient nations themselves find it relevant”.209 Although this 
work has aspired to determine neither the utility nor the applicability of a Turkish Model 
for the MENA, views on the relevancy of the model could be significant in broader 
analyses of model debates and these views cannot be completely comprehended 
without the inclusion of Arab perceptions. This is a point that ought to be taken into 
consideration in further research.            
 
  
                                               
209
 Ülgen, “From Inspiration to Aspiration”, 15.   
63 
 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: Map of showing the various results and the state of the Arab 
Spring in the region210 
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